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INTRODUCTION
When and what kinds of extrinsic evidence should courts
admit in order to interpret the meaning of a contract? Courts
must answer this question before they can begin the process
of interpretation, and the answer has profound implications
for whether courts achieve the goals of predictability and
fairness that motivate the law of contracts. 1
1. See Eric A. Posner, The Parol Evidence Rule, the Plain Meaning Rule,
and the Principles of Contract Interpretation, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 533, 542–46
(1998) (discussing the costs and benefits of strict and lenient rules regarding the
admission of extrinsic evidence); Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract

GOLDSTEIN FINAL

2013]

7/1/2013 2:07 PM

THE PUBLIC MEANING RULE

75

In answer to this question, courts generally follow one of
two rules. 2 Under the plain meaning rule, evidence outside
the four corners of a contract is not admissible to interpret a
contract that appears unambiguous on its face. 3 Under the
context rule, however, courts must consider extrinsic evidence
to interpret the language of a contract, even where the
contract appears facially unambiguous. 4
Each of these rules is problematic, albeit in very different
ways. The plain meaning rule allows more sophisticated
parties to hide behind carefully worded contracts of adhesion
without fear that the circumstances surrounding the contract
The plain meaning rule also ties the
might intrude. 5
interpretation of contract terms to a judge’s subjective notions
of what words mean in language and prevents parties from
submitting evidence of alternate meanings that may be
publically used and acknowledged, but not set forth in a
standard dictionary. 6 Furthermore, the plain meaning rule
(or at least unsophisticated versions of it) relies upon the
notion that words and phrases can, standing alone, have a
single unequivocal meaning—a notion that has been
thoroughly debunked by modern scholars who study
language. 7
While the context rule responds to the issues associated
with interpreting language in a vacuum, it relies upon
unreliable evidence in order to give meaning to contract
Parties lie and misremember, especially
language. 8
Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, 113 YALE L.J. 541, 618 (2003)
[hereinafter Schwartz & Scott, Contract Theory]; Eyal Zamir, The Inverted
Hierarchy of Contract Interpretation and Supplementation, 97 COLUM. L. REV.
1710, 1722–23 (1997). See also E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS §§ 7.7–7.14
(1982).
2. This statement is a bit of an oversimplification. As explained below,
there are variants of the context rule that differ in the order of preference with
which courts treat various forms of extrinsic evidence. There are also variants
of the plain meaning rule that differ in the strictness with which courts limit
themselves to the text of the contract alone. But generally speaking, courts
either look first to the language of the contract itself to determine whether it
bears only a single interpretation, or instead look to extrinsic evidence to
determine whether the contract is ambiguous in the first place.
3. See infra Part II.
4. See infra Part III.
5. See infra Part II.A.2.
6. See infra Part II.A.3.
7. See infra Part II.A.
8. See infra Part III.A.2.
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regarding extrinsic evidence such as prior negotiations,
course of performance, and course of dealing. Also, extrinsic
evidence of parties’ prior acts is often compatible with
numerous contradictory accounts of what the parties
intended, and thus fails to shed light on the parties’ actual
bargain. In many cases, it is questionable whether a court
can determine contracting parties’ intent at all (as opposed to
a contract’s textual meaning), even when extrinsic evidence is
not restricted. Most problematically, by looking to evidence of
the parties’ subjective intent, rather than the shared and
public meaning of terms, the context rule undermines the
usefulness of contracts as tools to predictably constrain
another party’s behavior. And it is this ability to predictably
constrain another party’s behavior that, in large part, makes
coordinated human activity possible.
Taking into account the criticisms levied against both the
plain meaning rule and the context rule, this Article proposes
a third rule for interpreting negotiated commercial contracts,
the public meaning rule, which looks to extrinsic evidence of
the public and conventional meaning of words and phrases in
language, as opposed to evidence of what words meant in the
head of the speaker. 9 Under the public meaning rule, the
court applies the public conventional meaning of the words
and phrases in the contract in order to interpret the contract,
and then from that interpretation, resolves the parties’
dispute. This rule would admit evidence of a word or phrase’s
public and conventional meaning within language, including
evidence outside of dictionary meaning such as trade usage,
to interpret even what appears to be a facially unambiguous
contract. This rule would exclude, however, evidence that
does not relate to what words mean publically in language,
such as evidence of the parties’ course of performance or
course of dealing, when interpreting an otherwise facially
unambiguous contract.
The epistemological basis for this rule is the fact that
people must employ public and shared conventions regarding
what words mean in order to communicate. The public and
conventional meaning of words can shed light on the
intentions of the speaker, but the intention of the speaker
cannot be what gives words their meaning. This is so
9. See infra Part IV.
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because, in order for people to communicate, both the speaker
and the hearer must reflexively apply the same public and
shared conventions for using words. 10
In this Article, I argue that courts should abandon
extrinsic evidence typically associated with the subjective
intent of the parties, such as evidence of the parties’ course of
performance or course of dealing, as a basis for interpreting
negotiated commercial contracts, unless the contract is
intractably ambiguous. 11 Courts have increasingly seen this
notion of the intent of the parties as a basis for interpreting
contracts as problematic. As early as the nineteenth century,
legal scholars and jurists began moving away from the
concept of a subjective meeting of the minds towards the socalled objective theory of contract where a party’s intent is
discerned from the objective manifestations of that intent,
such as the party’s acts. However, as explained below, even
so-called objective manifestations cannot tell us what the
parties to a contract subjectively intended. A given set of
objective manifestations is often compatible with numerous
contradictory accounts of what a party actually intended. 12
Paradoxically, the courts’ search for the intent of the
parties ends up leading courts away from the function that
parties intend their contracts to perform, that is, to mutually
constrain each other’s behavior in a way that is certain and
predictable. When courts look to evidence of subjective
intent, they untie contract adjudication from the public
conventions of meaning that allows parties to set their
agreements in writing in a way that can be predictably
enforced. And even though parties do not always have a
shared intent as to those details of a contract which they
ultimately decide to litigate, the very act of entering into a
contract implies a shared intent that the words of the
contract set the limits within which the process of contract
interpretation must be carried out.
Rather than looking to evidence that is commonly
associated with the parties’ subjective intent to give meaning
to contract language, courts should limit the application of
such evidence to equitable claims and defenses—i.e., where

10. See infra Part IV.
11. See infra Part IV.
12. See infra Part IV.A.
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courts are concerned about fairness, not about what a
contract actually means.
Where courts allow extrinsic
evidence in service of such equitable principles, it reflects not
an attempt to determine the meaning of language in a
contract, but quite the opposite, a willingness to sacrifice
some certainty of meaning and predictability of effect in the
name of fairness. When courts apply equitable claims and
defenses, they in effect throw out the rules that the parties
agreed to because those rules, in their substance or in their
application, are just too unfair. This trade off should be made
explicitly through equity and not under the guise of
interpretation.
One might argue that allowing unlimited extrinsic
evidence in cases of equitable claims and defenses, as a
practical matter, opens the floodgates to the same kinds of
extrinsic evidence as the context rule, rendering the proposal
in this Article a distinction without a difference. But as
argued below, different and usually tougher standards apply
to equitable claims and defenses, and a jurisprudence that
looks to evidence of the parties’ course of performance and
course of dealing only when applying equitable claims and
defenses will be different as a practical matter and not just in
theory.
While the rule proposed in this Article makes sense in
the context of negotiated commercial contracts, it could lead
to abuses outside of this context. This proposed rule could
have very negative consequences if applied to consumer
contracts, especially contracts of adhesion, where evidence of
public and conventional meaning is less relevant and where
the terms are set by commercial entities that enjoy a position
of superior power and sophistication.
In the context of negotiated commercial contracts,
however, restricting parties to evidence of usage will protect
contracting parties from the uncertainties of extrinsic
evidence associated with subjective intent and the legal
gamesmanship it engenders. And it will still allow parties to
supplement judges’ preconceptions regarding what words
mean with evidence that is harder to fabricate or game for
purposes of litigation.
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Part I of this Article describes the current state of the
law regarding the admission of extrinsic evidence. 13 Part II
describes the plain meaning rule, the primary motivations
behind it, and various criticisms that can be made against
it. 14 Part III describes the context rule, which has more
recently been adopted in several jurisdictions, and argues
that it is problematic in its own way, especially when applied
to negotiated commercial contracts. 15
Specifically, the
contextualist endeavor of discerning the parties’ intent
through extrinsic evidence is problematic (e.g., through
evidence of course of dealing, course of performance, or
testimony from the parties themselves regarding what they
meant).
Drawing upon the criticisms levied against both the plain
meaning rule and the context rule, Part IV proposes a new
rule for interpreting negotiated commercial contracts that
abandons the subjective intent of the parties as the
touchstone for contract interpretation. Part IV proposes that,
for negotiated commercial contracts, courts should determine
the meaning of contract terms by looking to the public,
shared, and conventional meaning of those terms (and as
explained below, limited biographical information regarding
the parties, if necessary, to decide between multiple public
meanings). 16 If a court cannot resolve the meaning of the
contract through evidence of what the contract’s words and
phrases mean in language and limited biographical evidence,
then the contract is ambiguous and courts should resort to
extrinsic evidence of the facts and circumstances surrounding
the parties’ contract, not to interpret the contract, but to
apply equitable principles.
Part IV goes on to argue that the rule proposed in this
Article better reflects and supports the reason why parties
enter into contracts, that is, to predictably constrain another
party’s future behavior. 17 Part IV also argues that equitable
claims and defenses, which were created for the very purpose
of achieving fairness, are a better mechanism for
implementing our notions of fairness than shoehorning such
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

See infra Part I.
See infra Part II.
See infra Part III.
See infra Part IV.
See infra Part IV.

GOLDSTEIN FINAL

80

7/1/2013 2:07 PM

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53

consideration into the rules for contract interpretation.
Finally, Part IV addresses how issues of ambiguity would be
resolved under the public meaning rule proposed in this
Article. 18
I.

THE CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW REGARDING EXTRINSIC
EVIDENCE

Contract interpretation is a multistage process in which,
at each juncture, the court must decide what evidence it will
consider. 19 There is universal agreement that, at the outset,
courts must consider the language of the contract. The
various jurisdictions then diverge as to what additional
evidence courts should consider to determine whether the
contract is ambiguous.
Where courts look to various
categories of extrinsic evidence in this first stage, these same
courts take different positions regarding the order of
precedence of each type of extrinsic evidence. Under the
Uniform Commercial Code, for example, courts look to the
text of the contract, along with evidence of the parties’ course
of performance, course of dealing, and trade practice and
usage at this initial stage, resorting to each of these
categories of extrinsic evidence in order with the former
trumping the latter. 20
The rules regarding when and what kind of extrinsic
evidence is admissible at the initial phase of contract
interpretation vary greatly from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. 21
18. See infra Part IV.D.
19. See Zamir, supra note 1, at 1710.
20. Id. at 1712–13. As explained in Part IV below, this Article is not
concerned with the order of preference courts apply to various types of extrinsic
evidence, per se. Rather, this Article argues that certain types of extrinsic
evidence should not be considered at all at the initial stage where the court
determines whether a contract is ambiguous. See infra Part IV.
21. There is a good amount of confusion regarding what exactly the parol
evidence rule is and the parol evidence rule is often conflated with the plain
meaning rule. Likewise, the term “parol evidence” is often conflated with the
term “extrinsic evidence.” The parol evidence rule prohibits parties from
admitting extrinsic evidence of prior or contemporaneous oral agreements to
interpret an integrated contract, while the plain meaning rule prohibits a party
from admitting extrinsic evidence to interpret a facially unambiguous term.
See Margaret N. Kniffin, Conflating And Confusing Contract Interpretation and
the Parol Evidence Rule: Is the Emperor Wearing Someone Else’s Clothes?, 62
RUTGERS L. REV. 75, 81 (2009) (quoting Sunoco, Inc. v. Makol, 372 F.3d 31, 36
n.1 (1st Cir. 2004)). Many of the sources referenced in this Article incorrectly
use the terms “parol evidence” and “extrinsic evidence” synonymously. Where
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Certain jurisdictions continue to cleave to a strict plain
meaning rule, refusing to admit extrinsic evidence to
interpret a facially unambiguous contract. 22 In Savik v.
Entech, Inc., the Supreme Court of Montana held that “there
can be no evidence of the terms of the agreement other than
the contents of the writing except when a mistake or
imperfection in the writing is claimed or when the validity of
Likewise, in
the agreement is the fact in dispute.” 23
Tallmadge Bros., Inc. v. Iroquois Gas Transmission System,
L.P., the Supreme Court of Connecticut declared:
We decline to abandon the basic principal of contract law
that we construe contract language by reference to the
words chosen by the parties. Especially in the context of
commercial contracts, we assume that definite contract
language is the best indication of the result anticipated by
the parties in their contractual arrangements. 24

Other jurisdictions, however, have abandoned the plain
meaning rule, holding that extrinsic evidence is admissible to
interpret a contract regardless of any facial ambiguity. 25 The
Supreme Court of Alaska applied such a rule in Municipality
of Anchorage v. Gentile:
In determining the intent of the parties the court looks to
the written contract as well as extrinsic evidence
regarding the parties’ intent at the time the contract was
made.
The parties’ expectations are assessed by
examining the language used in the contract, case law
interpreting similar language, and relevant extrinsic
evidence, including the subsequent conduct of the
parties. 26

this Article quotes such sources, the term “parol evidence rule” is being used to
mean a rule for when extrinsic evidence is admissible to interpret the language
of a contract.
22. See Peter Linzer, The Comfort of Certainty: Plain Meaning and the Parol
Evidence Rule, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 799, 805 n.28 (2002).
23. Savik v. Entech, Inc, 923 P.2d 1091, 1094 (Mont. 1996).
24. Tallmadge Bros., Inc. v. Iroquois Gas Transmission Sys., L.P., 746 A.2d
1277, 1289 (Conn. 2000) (emphasis added). As discussed throughout this
Article, stricter rules for the admission of extrinsic evidence are more
appropriately applied to negotiated commercial contracts as opposed to
consumer contracts of adhesion.
25. See, e.g., Municipality of Anchorage v. Gentile, 922 P.2d 248, 256
(Alaska 1996).
26. Id. (citations omitted).
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These jurisdictions often apply the caveat that such
extrinsic evidence cannot be used to vary or contradict the
contract. 27 For example, the court in Admiral Builders
Savings & Loan Ass’n v. South River Landing, Inc., held that
extrinsic evidence is admissible to determine whether a
contract is ambiguous in the first instance, but that such
extrinsic evidence cannot be used to vary, alter, or contradict
the plain meaning of the writing. 28
[I]n the initial determination of ambiguity, vel non,
extrinsic evidence need not be excluded from the trial
court’s consideration (so long as that evidence does not
vary, alter, or contradict the plain meaning of the writing)
because, until the evidence is heard, ambiguity or the lack
thereof cannot be fully appreciated. 29

Still other courts apply various hybrids of the two. For
example in Mellon Bank, N.A. v. Aetna Business Credit, Inc., 30
the Third Circuit held that courts ought to consider extrinsic
evidence of the facts and circumstances surrounding a
contract before determining whether the contract is
ambiguous, 31 but further held that there are limits on the
range of meanings that words can bear. As the court
explained:
[O]ur approach does not authorize a trial judge to demote
the written word to a reduced status in contract
interpretation.
Although extrinsic evidence may be
considered under proper circumstances, the parties
remain bound by the appropriate objective definition of
the words they use to express their intent. Generally
parties will be held to definitions given to words in
specialized commercial and trade areas in which they
deal. Similarly, certain words attain binding definition as
legal terms of art. 32

27. As discussed below, this idea that extrinsic evidence gives contract
language its meaning but cannot be used to contradict the contract is
problematic. See infra Part III.A.3.
28. Admiral Builders Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. S. River Landing, Inc., 502 A.2d
1096, 1099 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1986).
29. Id.
30. Mellon Bank, N.A. v. Aetna Bus. Credit, Inc., 619 F.2d 1001 (3d Cir.
1980).
31. Id. at 1010–11.
32. Id. at 1013.
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In Mellon Bank, the court analyzed whether the term
“insolvent” should be interpreted according to its standard
commercial definition, i.e., a business is insolvent where “[it
is] unable to pay [its] debts as they come due,” or “[its]
liabilities exceed its assets.” 33 The trial court looked to
extrinsic evidence showing that Aetna had not considered
Mellon Bank’s assets and liabilities when the parties entered
into their contract. 34 Accordingly, (so the argument went) the
parties had not intended the term “insolvent” to mean
“liabilities exceeding assets.” 35 The Third Circuit reversed,
holding that the term “insolvent” was too well established to
be contradicted by extrinsic evidence. 36
Even within a particular jurisdiction, the rules regarding
extrinsic evidence are not always uniformly applied. As
Professor Linzer observed in his scholarship regarding plain
meaning and extrinsic evidence, “[o]ften lower courts stick to
older, more rigid rules and ignore, or at least do not follow,
liberalizing cases from their state’s supreme court.” 37
II. THE PLAIN MEANING RULE
Courts that strictly apply the plain meaning rule
generally follow the following procedure for interpreting a
contract: First, the court looks to the text of the contract alone
and determines whether the contract is ambiguous on its
face. 38 If the contract is ambiguous on its face, the court will
admit extrinsic evidence in order to determine the contract’s
meaning. 39 Courts applying the plain meaning rule, however,
33. Id. at 1008.
34. Id. at 1008–09.
35. Id. at 1009.
36. Id. at 1013-14.
37. Linzer, supra note 22, at 806 (citing Student Loan Guarantee Found. of
Ark. v. Barnes, Quinn, Flake & Anderson, Inc., 806 S.W.2d 628 (Ark. Ct. App.
1991)). See Harry G. Prince, Contract Interpretation In California: Plain
Meaning, Parol Evidence and Use of the “Just Result” Principle, 31 LOY. L.A. L.
REV. 557, 577–78 (1998).
38. W.W.W. Assocs., Inc. v. Giancontieri, 566 N.E.2d 639, 642 (N.Y. 1990)
(“[E]xtrinsic and parol evidence is not admissible to create an ambiguity in a
written agreement which is complete and clear and unambiguous upon its
face.” (quoting Intercontinental Planning, Ltd. v. Daystrom, Inc., 248 N.E.2d
576, 580 (N.Y. 1969))).
39. Connors v. Tanoma Mining Co., 953 F.2d 682, 685 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (“A
contract’s meaning is to be determined by its language, without resort to
extrinsic considerations, unless the language is ambiguous.” (quoting Eatmon v.
Bristol Steel & Iron Works, Inc., 769 F.2d 1503, 1518 (11th Cir. 1985))).
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will allow in extrinsic evidence, regardless of any facial
ambiguity, to establish equitable claims (such as unjust
enrichment) 40 or equitable defenses to the contract (such as
fraud). 41
Early courts adopted the plain meaning rule as a
bulwark against faulty memory and dishonesty. 42 As the
court in The Countess of Rutland’s Case declared, “it would be
inconvenient, that matters in writing made by advice and on
consideration, and which finally import the certain truth of
the agreement of the parties should be controlled by
averment of the parties to be proved by the uncertain
testimony of slippery memory.” 43
The plain meaning rule arguably grew out of prenineteenth century common law conventions that privileged
sealed instruments over all other forms of evidence of a legal
obligation. 44 Under this pre-nineteenth century rule, a
writing under seal could not be controverted or varied by
written or oral evidence because sealed documents were
presumed to be the best evidence of a party’s intent to be
bound. 45 Other commentators have suggested that the plain
meaning rule arose not as a natural evolution of prior
common law notions of what was necessary to “seal a deal,”
but instead out of a concerted effort by jurists such as
Langdell, Williston, and Holmes, to remake the common law
40. See, e.g., Midwest Indus. Funding, Div. of Rivera Lend Lease, Inc. v.
First Nat’l Bank of Lockport, 973 F.2d 534, 539 (7th Cir. 1992) (“The parties
should be allowed to admit extrinsic evidence relevant to the Bank’s unjust
enrichment defense.”).
41. See Happy Dack Trading Co. v. Agro-Industries, Inc., 602 F. Supp. 986,
992 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (“[P]arol evidence is admissible to show that a contract is
not a contract but a sham . . . .”). See also Callanan v. Powers, 92 N.E. 747, 753
(N.Y. 1910) (“It is claimed that these conversations were incompetent, because
they were merged in the written contract, according to the familiar rule. The
plaintiff, however, had alleged fraud as a ground of rescission, and he had a
right to prove the existence of fraud if he could. On that issue the contemporary
and preceding conversations, both those involving representations and those
tending to show that the directors relied upon them were competent, and,
although the plaintiff did not succeed on the issue of fraud, still the receipt of
that evidence was not error.”)
42. See, e.g., The Countess of Rutland’s Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 89, 90 (K.B.
1604), 5 Co. Rep. 25b.
43. Id.
44. See Joseph M. Perillo, The Origins of the Objective Theory of Contract
Formation and Interpretation, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 427, 434 (2000) (citing WM.
L. CLARK, JR., HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 262 (1894)).
45. Id.
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for purposes of a grand theory of contract, which would
accommodate free-market capitalism during the industrial
revolution. 46
Regardless of its origins, the plain meaning rule came to
be embraced by formalists as a curative to the vagaries of the
subjective intent of the parties. Rather than attempt to
divine the parties’ actual subjective intent through the
parties’ testimony and other extrinsic evidence, courts would
limit themselves to the plain meaning of the contract
language itself. 47 As commentators from as early as 1810
explained, “[t]o admit a party to a contract to support it by his
own testimony in an action brought upon it, would destroy all
security for our property . . . . ”48 As jurists from across the
Atlantic simultaneously explained, “[i]t would, indeed, be
highly mischievous, and tend to the endangering all property
. . . if such parol testimony should be admitted . . . . It would
tend greatly to introduce perjuries . . . to the great hazard of
the titles of all property.” 49
As described more recently by the high court in New
York, the plain meaning rule brings “stability to commercial
transactions by safeguarding against fraudulent claims,
perjury, death of witnesses . . . infirmity of memory . . . [and]
the fear that the jury will improperly evaluate the extrinsic
evidence.” 50 As one author put it, “[t]he conceptual move that
launched the rule seems quite natural today: the written
agreement is not merely a memorandum that summarizes
understandings between people.
Rather, the document
46. See id. at 428 (“Grant Gilmore’s account holds that Christopher
Columbus Langdell invented the generalized notion of contract in 1871, which
was brilliantly reformulated by Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., and then
propagated by a diligent scrivener named Williston. Gilmore credits Holmes
with the invention of the objective theory. Like Horwitz and Friedman, Gilmore
attributes the creation of late nineteenth century classical contract doctrine to a
response to the same stimuli that gave rise to laissez-faire economics.”
(footnotes omitted)).
47. See id. at 443–44.
48. Id. (quoting ZEPHANIA SWIFT, A DIGEST OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE IN
CIVIL AND CRIMINAL CASES AND A TREATISE ON BILLS OF EXCHANGE 99 (1810)).
49. Id. at 445 (quoting Holmes v. Simons, 20 S.C. Eq. (3 Des.) 149, 152
(1810)).
50. W.W.W. Assocs., Inc. v. Giancontieri, 566 N.E.2d 639, 642 (N.Y. 1990)
(citation omitted). See also Robert E. Scott, The Case for Formalism in
Relational Contract, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 847, 848 (2000) (arguing that a “rigorous
application of the common-law plain meaning and parol evidence rules preserve
the value of predictable interpretation . . . .”)
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constitutes the agreement itself.” 51
Under the plain meaning rule, a court will only look
beyond the text of the contract itself when the contract,
standing alone, cannot be given a single clear meaning. 52 And
thus the traditional plain meaning rule takes for granted that
words and properly constructed phrases are capable of having
a single unambiguous meaning.
A. Problems with the Plain Meaning Rule
1. The Problem with Plain Meaning in Principal
As many critics of the plain meaning rule have opined, it
is very difficult to attribute a singular plain meaning to a
word and it is even more difficult to do so to an entire
contractual provision. 53 As one critic put it:
A judge who believes that contract terms can have a
single, reasonable meaning that is apparent without
reference to extrinsic evidence of the parties’ intentions
“retires into that lawyer’s Paradise where all words have a
fixed, precisely ascertained meaning; where [people] may
express their purposes, not only with accuracy, but with
fulness [sic]; and where, if the writer has been careful, a
lawyer . . . may sit in [a] chair, inspect the text, and
answer all questions . . . .” Such a belief is unrealistic, for
“the fatal necessity of looking outside the text in order to
identify persons and things, tends steadily to destroy such
illusions and to reveal the essential imperfection of
language, whether spoken or written.” 54

As Arthur Corbin, one of the most famous critics of the
plain meaning rule, explained:
It is true that when a judge reads the words of a contract
he may jump to the instant and confident opinion that
they have but one reasonable meaning and that he knows
what it is. A greater familiarity with dictionaries and the
51. Lawrence M. Solan, The Written Contract as Safe Harbor for Dishonest
Conduct, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 87, 92 (2001).
52. See Margaret N. Kniffin, A New Trend In Contract Interpretation: The
Search For Reality as Opposed to Virtual Reality, 74 OR. L. REV. 643, 648 (1995)
(“The ambiguity thus required by these courts as prerequisite to admission of
extrinsic evidence is often said to exist when the contract language is
reasonably susceptible to at least two different meanings.”).
53. See, e.g., id. at 644–45 n.3.
54. Id. at 648 (alteration in original) (quoting JAMES BRADLEY THAYER, A
PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW 428–29 (1898)).
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usages of words, a better understanding of the
uncertainties of language, and a comparative study of
more cases in the field of interpretation, will make one
beware of holding such an opinion so recklessly arrived
at. 55

These scholars make the point that a word’s meaning is
often, if not always, unfixed, and can only be determined in
context.
2. The Plain Meaning Rule as a Cover for Exploitive
Contracts
A strict plain meaning rule can enable exploitive
business practices at the contract formation stage. 56 A strict
plain meaning rule provides companies with a “safe harbor
for sharp business practices that results from any version of
the rule that permits businesses to promote products and
services subject to a subsequent, integrated agreement that
the other party did not read or understand when entering
into a transaction.” 57
Professor Solan outlines three types of contracts where a
strict plain meaning rule allows a sophisticated commercial
company to exploit another party’s lack of bargaining power
and sophistication: consumer credit agreements (e.g., credit
card agreements); shrink wrap contracts (i.e., form contracts
shipped along with goods); and certain promissory notes. 58
The plain meaning rule can help sophisticated sellers of
commercial credit abuse their superior bargaining position. 59
As many of us have experienced firsthand, purveyors of
consumer credit will often send their would-be customers
applications for credit that clearly disclose terms which would
make the offer enticing, while burying less favorable terms in
blocks of “devil in the details” fine print. 60 Now certainly if
the print is fine enough or the terms monstrously unfair,
courts may not enforce them for equitable reasons such as
unconscionability. But if the terms or the manner in which

55. Id. at 644–45 n.3 (quoting 3 ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS
§ 535 (1960)).
56. See Solan, supra note 51, at 90, 106–14.
57. Id. at 90.
58. Id. at 106–14.
59. See id. at 109.
60. See id. at 107–08.
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they are communicated do not rise to the level of procedural
or substantive unconscionability, credit peddlers, under a
strict plain meaning rule, can hide behind a contract that is
sneaky but not sneaky enough to be torn up by the court. As
Professor Solan explains:
Credit card issuers can circulate such applications because
they know that ultimately it is the written agreement that
will govern, and the written agreement will have no such
silly contradictions. The parol evidence rule [in its plain
meaning rule form] comes into this picture once the
borrower has agreed to abide by the credit agreement by
signing the application or by using the credit card. 61

Professor Solan also points to shrink wrap contracts (also
known as box-top contracts), which like the consumer credit
transactions discussed above, are both consumer contracts
and contracts of adhesion. Shrink wrap contracts are form
contracts that are bundled with goods when they are shipped.
The terms of such contracts usually state something like “by
using this product you agree to be bound by the following
terms.” 62 Again, a plain meaning rule in this context makes it
easier for companies to bind consumers to one sided terms,
which the consumer is less likely to read or understand.
Professor Solan also points to a particular kind of
promissory note transaction where one company convinces
another to sign a promissory note for outstanding amounts
due, payable on demand, but orally promises to not execute
for a particular period of time. 63 The idea being that the
debtor will readily agree to such a contract rather than face
immediate default. It is unclear, however, whether this type
of dishonest conduct is one which, in fact, ends up being
protected under the plain meaning rule.
In many
jurisdictions, equitable doctrines outside of the plain meaning
rule are likely to aid the signer of such a promissory note, at
least in those cases where a strict plain meaning rule would
seem to produce unfair results. Under even a strict plain
meaning rule, extrinsic evidence is admissible to prove fraud
or other defenses which assert that no contract was formed in
the first place. 64
61.
62.
63.
64.

Id. at 109.
Id.
Id. at 112–13.
Even under a centuries-old formulation of the plain meaning rule, a
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Notice that the first two types of contracts discussed by
Professor Solan are both consumer contracts and contracts of
adhesion. As mentioned in the introduction of this Article, a
strict plain meaning rule is far more problematic when
applied to consumer contracts, especially contracts of
adhesion. Indeed, Professor Solan’s analysis is a strong
argument for having different rules for interpreting and
applying consumer contracts of adhesion. As he recognizes,
reliance on the language of the contract itself rather than
extrinsic evidence tends to amplify power and sophistication
disparities between parties:
Reliance on the written word is a two-edged sword. On
the one hand, it reduces the likelihood of dispute about
what the agreement (or statute) really says. On the other,
it empowers the party with the pen. When only one party
to the transaction controls the document, the possibility
arises that the drafter will take advantage of this leverage
unfairly. 65

In negotiated commercial contracts, disparities in power,
sophistication, and access to legal counsel are less severe.
The very fact that a contract is negotiated rather than a
contract of adhesion evinces a greater parity of power
between the parties. By comparison, consumer contracts are
often contracts of adhesion, which do not allow the consumer
any opportunity to negotiate contractual terms.
The
problems associated with restricting extrinsic evidence are
thus less pronounced in the context of negotiated commercial
contracts—the context in which this Article suggests that a
more restrictive rule regarding extrinsic evidence ought to be
applied. 66
party was allowed to escape liability by showing that they entered into the
contract by fraud or mistake. JOHN H. WIGMORE, 9 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE:
EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2405, at 15 (James H. Chadbourn ed.,
4th ed. 1981) [hereinafter WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE] (“That a man who could not
read had sealed a document which had been incorrectly read over to him, was
recognized, before the 1400s, as sufficient to relieve him from liability.”); Staver
v. Rogers, 28 P. 906, 907 (Wash. 1892) (holding that extrinsic evidence is
inadmissible “without an allegation in the pleadings that such contract was in
fact signed by the party making such allegations by mistake or fraud, or
without full knowledge of the conditions thereof.”).
65. Solan, supra note 51, at 92.
66. As discussed below, the reason for applying a more strict rule regarding
extrinsic evidence is not because meaning somehow arises differently in
negotiated commercial contracts as opposed to consumer contracts of adhesion.
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3. Plain Meaning, Ambiguity, and Reasonableness:
Whose Plain Meaning Should Govern?
Another problem with the plain meaning rule is that it
ties the interpretation of contract language to the subjective
understanding of the interpreting judge by excluding
extrinsic evidence of the public and conventional meaning of
language. Under the plain meaning rule, a court must first
determine whether a contract is ambiguous on its face. 67 A
contract is considered ambiguous if it is subject to two or
more reasonable interpretations. 68
This formulation requires a judge to determine whether
each party’s proposed interpretation is reasonable, and to do
so armed only with the judge’s own preconceptions regarding
what the particular terms in question mean. As many
scholars have recognized in the context of tort law and
criminal law (especially in regard to claims of self-defense),
when a judge or jury is required to determine whether
something is reasonable, without any further guidance, the
judge or jury’s preconceptions regarding what is reasonable
In the context of criminal
infect the determination. 69
defendants claiming self-defense, this can lead to, for
example, a jury’s racial biases excusing violent conduct that
was, at least in part, motivated by racial stereotypes
regarding the victim. 70
But reasonableness determinations can and do lead to
problems in the commercial contract context as well. The
notion that a contract is ambiguous if it is subject to more
than one reasonable interpretation injects a judge’s subjective
notions of meaning into a process that purports to be
concerned with objectivity and predictability.
If the

Rather, the possibility of exploitable contracts provides equitable grounds for
allowing in a broader range of extrinsic evidence.
67. See W.W.W. Assocs., Inc. v. Giancontieri, 566 N.E.2d 639, 642 (N.Y.
1990) (“[E]xtrinsic and parol evidence is not admissible to create an ambiguity
in a written agreement which is complete and clear and unambiguous upon its
face.” (quoting Intercontinental Planning, Ltd. v. Daystrom, Inc., 248 N.E.2d
576, 580 (N.Y. 1969)).
68. See, e.g., Cent. Auto Co. v. Reichert, 273 N.W.2d 360, 364–65 (Wis. Ct.
App. 1978) (“Words and phrases in a contract are ambiguous when they are
reasonably susceptible to more than one meaning.”).
69. See, e.g., Aaron D. Goldstein, Note, Race, Reasonableness, and the Rule
of Law, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 1189, 1190 (2003).
70. See id.
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preconceptions of the judge determine reasonableness, then
the law of contracts is made unpredictable, or perhaps worse,
made into a game where litigants intentionally play to such
preconceptions. This is especially problematic in contracts
involving a highly technical subject matter, where ambiguity
may be apparent to someone familiar with relevant trade
usage, but not apparent to a judge who is asked to make a
reasonableness determination, in the first instance, within
the four corners of the contract alone.
As the court in Metric Constructors, Inc. v. NASA
recognized, the plain meaning rule can fail to account for the
parties’ reasonable commercial expectations, even where the
language of a contract appears facially unambiguous. 71
In Metric Constructors, the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit (CAFC) analyzed whether evidence of trade
practice is admissible to determine if terms within a contract
are ambiguous. 72 Prior to the court’s decision in Metric
Constructors, the CAFC had issued several conflicting
opinions regarding when evidence of trade practice and usage
are admissible to interpret the meaning of contract terms. 73
In Metric Constructors, the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration (NASA) awarded a contract to Metric
Constructors, Inc. to build a space station processing facility
at the Kennedy Space Center in Florida. 74 A major part of
the contract required the contractor to install “new lamps” in
fluorescent light fixtures capable of high-intensity lighting
“immediately prior to completion of the project.” 75 The
president of Metric’s electrical subcontractor, Meisner
Electric, Inc., testified that he interpreted the specification to
require “(a) the installation of new lamps in the facility and
(b) immediately prior to the contract completion or the
provision of beneficial occupancy of specific rooms or areas,
the replacement of any defective, burned out, or broken
lamps.” 76

71. Metric Constructors, Inc. v. NASA, 169 F.3d 747, 754 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
72. Id. at 753.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 748.
75. Id. at 749.
76. Metric Constructors, Inc. v. NASA, ASBCA No. 48,852, 98-1 BCA ¶
29,384, at 146,046.
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After NASA inspected the facility towards the end of the
project, it created a punch list of items the contractor had to
address before the contract would be considered fulfilled. 77
The list included a “request to relamp the facility.” 78 The
ASBCA 79 later found that in the electrical industry, the term
“relamping” is used to describe the “total replacement of
lamps at a particular facility,” and “[i]t is uncommon for
specifications for new construction to require relamping.” 80
The board also found that NASA’s estimate for the cost of the
project did not include the cost of this relamping work. 81
After receiving the punch list, Metric sent NASA a letter
requesting that NASA put off or eliminate the replacement of
working lamps from the specifications of the contract. 82 The
Contract Officer responded by deleting the contract
requirement to install new lamps from Metric’s scope of
After about ten months of unsuccessful price
work. 83
negotiation, the Contract Officer unilaterally reduced the
contract price by $132,570 for the work deleted by the
modification. 84
On appeal to the ASBCA, Metric argued that the absence
of the trade term “relamping” in the specification “reasonably
led to the interpretation that it was required to replace only
those lamps which did not work.” 85 The Board refused to
consider evidence of trade usage after it determined that the
work described in the contract was not ambiguous: “It is
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. The Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals is described as follows
on the ASBCA’s website:
The ASBCA is a neutral, independent forum which has been in
existence for over fifty years. Its primary function is to hear and
decide post-award contract disputes between government contractors
and the Department of Defense; the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration; the Central Intelligence Agency, as appropriate; and
other entities with whom the ASBCA has entered into agreements to
provide services.
ARMED SERVS. BD. OF CONTRACT APPEALS, http://www.asbca.mil/ (last visited
Sept. 30, 2012).
80. Metric Constructors, Inc. v. NASA, ASBCA No. 48,852, 98-1 BCA ¶
29,384, at 146,045.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 146,046–47.
83. Id. at 146,047.
84. See id. at 146,048.
85. Id. at 146,051.
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difficult to divine a less ambiguous requirement than that for
‘new lamps.’ ” 86 Thus, according to the ASBCA, because the
contract language was unambiguous, Metric could not submit
evidence of trade practice or custom to vary the unambiguous
terms. 87 The ASBCA held that “NASA was entitled to issue
the deductive change,” 88 and that the amount deducted was
“reasonable.” 89
On appeal, the CAFC stated that the case “squarely
presents the recurring issue of the role of evidence of trade
practice and custom in contract interpretation.” 90
The court identified two lines of cases that deal with the
“role of evidence of trade practice and custom in contract
interpretation.” 91 The first line of cases holds that a court
“may consult evidence of trade practice and custom to discern
the meaning of an ambiguous contract provision, but not to
contradict or override an unambiguous contract provision.” 92
The second line of cases holds that a court “may consult
evidence of trade practice and custom to show that ‘language
which appears on its face to be perfectly clear and ambiguous
has, in fact, a meaning different from its ordinary
meaning.’ ” 93 The first approach to contract interpretation
assumes that language is capable of having a plain and
unambiguous meaning on its face, and that such meaning
should govern the interpretation of a contract. 94
Ultimately, the court adopted a standard closer to the
second line of cases. After accepting evidence of industry
usage from the plaintiff, the court ruled that by failing to use
the term “relamping” to describe the work that it sought,
NASA had created ambiguous specifications that had to be
construed against NASA—the party that drafted it. 95

86. Metric Constructors, Inc. v. NASA, 169 F.3d 747 (Fed. Cir. 1999),
ASBCA No. 48,852, 98-1 BCA ¶ 29,384, at 146,050
87. Id.
88. Id. at 146,051.
89. Id. at 146,052.
90. Metric Constructors, Inc., v. NASA, 169 F.3d 747, 751 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. (quoting Gholson, Byars & Holmes Const. Co. v. United States, 351
F.2d 987, 999 (Ct. Cl. 1965).
94. Id.
95. Id. at 754.
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As the court in Metric Constructors explained:
Trade practice and custom illuminate the context for the
parties’ contract negotiations and agreements. Before an
interpreting court can conclusively declare a contract
ambiguous or unambiguous, it must consult the context in
which the parties exchanged promises.
Excluding
evidence of trade practice and custom because the contract
terms are “unambiguous” on their face ignores the reality
of the context in which the parties contracted. That
context may well reveal that the terms of the contract are
not, and never were, clear on their face. On the other
hand, that context may well reveal that contract terms
are, and have consistently been, unambiguous. 96

The plaintiff in Metric Constructors also raised the point
that refusing to consider trade usage to interpret what
appears to be an unambiguous contract could lead to absurd
results, especially where a contract incorporates language
that may seem unambiguous to a person outside the relevant
industry, but that has a very different meaning within the
industry:
Metric points out that the vast majority of lamps for this
project (nearly 12,000 of about 13,000) had a life of six
years and eight months. The Board found that most of the
lamp installation occurred during the summer of 1993.
Metric delivered more than half of the facility in June and
October 1993, and ultimately completed the project the
following summer. Based on this sequence of events,
Metric points to the absurdity and waste of re-lamping
recently installed, long-lived lamps. 97

Thus the plain meaning rule can lead to absurd results
where the court is not aware of the usage of a term that is
employed by participants within an industry to which the
parties belong.
III. THE CONTEXT RULE: A RESPONSE TO THE PLAIN MEANING
RULE
The context rule is the culmination of decades of criticism
leveled against the plain meaning rule, which is grounded in
the notion that words are capable of possessing a singular

96. Id. at 752.
97. Id. at 750.
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plain meaning. 98 The impetus behind the context rule lies in
the critiques of scholars such as Arthur Corbin discussed
above.
Under the context rule, when a court decides whether a
contract is ambiguous in the first instance, the court must
examine the language of the contract itself along with all
extrinsic evidence of the parties’ intent. 99 Typically, courts
applying the context rule also hold that extrinsic evidence is
not admissible to vary or contradict the language of the
contract. 100
Put simply, the context rule states that extrinsic evidence
is always admissible to interpret even a facially unambiguous
contract. The Washington Supreme Court decision Berg v.
Hudesman 101 is often cited as an exemplar of the context rule
in action. In Berg, the Supreme Court of Washington
announced that “extrinsic evidence is admissible as to the
entire circumstances under which the contract was made, as
an aid in ascertaining the parties’ intent” even where a
contract appears unambiguous on its face. 102 In so holding,
the court abandoned the plain meaning rule, which excluded
extrinsic evidence in interpreting a fully integrated (i.e.
complete) and unambiguous contract. 103 Rather, the court
held that “parol evidence is admissible to show the situation
of the parties and the circumstances under which a written
instrument was executed, for the purpose of ascertaining the
intention of the parties and properly construing the
writing.” 104

98. See supra Part II.A.1.
99. See Berg v. Hudesman, 801 P.2d 222, 229, (Wash. 1990) (“[E]xtrinsic
evidence is admissible as to the entire circumstances under which the contract
was made, as an aid in ascertaining the parties’ intent.”). See also id. (“[P]arol
evidence is admissible to show the situation of the parties and the
circumstances under which a written instrument was executed, for the purpose
of ascertaining the intention of the parties and properly construing the writing.”
(quoting J.W. Seavey Hop Corp. v. Pollock, 147 P.2d 310, 316 (Wash. 1944)).
100. See In re Marriage of Schweitzer, 937 P.2d 1062, 1066 (Wash. 1997).
101. Berg, 801 P.2d 222.
102. Id. at 229.
103. Id. at 230.
104. Id. at 229 (quoting J.W. Seavey Hop, 147 P.2d at 316). See also Bort v.
Parker, 42 P.3d 980, 987 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002) (“A trial court may resort to
parol evidence for the limited purpose of construing the otherwise clear and
unambiguous language of a contract in order to determine the intent of the
parties.”).
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Some jurisdictions, such as Washington, have argued
that the context rule will not inject uncertainty into
contractual relationships because the plain meaning rule
“effectively does the same thing as the context rule.” 105 As the
court in Eagle Insurance Co. v. Albright explained:
If a context rule is applied, there will be no effective loss in
the certainty of writings, since it is submitted that the
plain meaning rule is used only where there is no
difference over the sense of the words anyway. Where this
is so, evidence on the context in which the words were
used would produce the same result as a reading of the
face of the writing. Where it is not so, the plain meaning
rule either gives way to its exception, which allows the
consideration of context evidence or it stands as a
mechanically applied bar to the most relevant obtainable
evidence of the sense of the words which the parties
desired to employ. 106

But as discussed below, there are fundamental problems
with applying extrinsic evidence of the parties’ subjective
intent to determine the meaning of the terms by which the
parties agreed to be bound. Contrary to the reassurances of
the court in Eagle Insurance, the context rule can and does
lead to uncertainty in contract interpretation. By letting in
all extrinsic evidence of the intent of the parties, the context
rule unmoors the courts from shared and public standards of
meaning and thereby invites gamesmanship and creates
uncertainty.
A. Problems with the Context Rule
1. Hunt Foods & Industries, Inc. v. Doliner, Illustrating
the Problem
The case of Hunt Foods & Industries, Inc. v. Doliner107
shows how the context rule can completely unmoor the
process of contract interpretation from the language that the
parties chose to govern any future dispute between them. 108
105. Eagle Ins. Co. v. Albright, 474 P.2d 920, 929 (Wash. Ct. App. 1970).
106. Id. (citing 3 ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS, § 536 (1960); 4
SAMUEL WILLISTON, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS §§ 609, 618, 629 (3d ed. 1961);
RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 230 (1932)).
107. Hunt Foods & Indus., Inc. v. Doliner, 270 N.Y.S.2d 937 (N.Y. App. Div.
1966).
108. See Jody S. Kraus & Robert E. Scott, Contract Design and the Structure
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In Hunt Foods, the court considered whether a facially
unconditional option to purchase stock could be treated as a
conditional option based upon communications between the
parties outside of the contract itself. 109
The parties in this case had been negotiating the sale of
the defendant’s shares in a corporation. 110 When negotiations
stalled, the parties entered into an option contract, under
which the plaintiff had the right to purchase all of the
defendant’s shares for $5.50 a share. 111 The plaintiff paid
$1000 in exchange for the option to purchase the shares. 112
The defendant admitted that, during the negotiations, his
counsel had “called attention to the fact that the option was
unconditional in its terms . . . .” 113 However, the defendant’s
attorney said “he obtained an understanding that [the option]
was only to be used in the event that [the defendant] solicited
an outside offer . . . .” 114 The defendant further admitted that
the “plaintiff insisted that unless the option was signed in
unconditional form negotiations would terminate.” 115
The Court of Appeals, nonetheless, held that the alleged
oral agreement that the option would only be exercisable if
the defendant entertained outside offers raised a sufficient
question of fact for the defendant to survive summary
judgment. 116 While the defendant recognized that the option
term was facially unconditional, the court ruled that evidence
that the option term was, in fact, conditional did not
contradict the parties’ written contract and was admissible. 117
Hunt Foods is an excellent example of a case where the
resort to extrinsic evidence undermined any certainty that
the parties had in relying upon the written terms of their
contract. 118 The defendant’s own attorney recognized and
of Contractual Intent, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1023, 1048–53 (2009).
109. Hunt Foods, 270 N.Y.S.2d at 939.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 940.
117. Id. at 939–40. “The conversations in this case, some of which are not
disputed, and the expectation of all the parties for further negotiations, suggest
that the alleged oral condition precedent cannot be precluded as a matter of law
. . . .” Id. at 940.
118. Case reports illustrating the problems with the context rule are, by
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reported to the defendant that the option term was
unconditional. 119 What is more, the plaintiff refused the
defendant’s request to include language making the plaintiff’s
option conditional. 120 It is hard to see how the plaintiff in this
case could have expressed his intent to obtain an
unconditional option more clearly. As Professors Kraus and
Scott recognized, the defendant “could not reasonably have
believed both that [the plaintiff] was content to receive a
legally conditional option and that [the plaintiff] had good
reason to insist that the condition not be stated in the
writing.” 121
By looking to extrinsic evidence contrary to the written
contractual terms the parties knowingly chose, the court
undermined the parties’ ability to firmly and effectively set
their agreement into writing in a manner that would be
predictably enforced by the court.
2. Memory and Veracity
Just as Professor Solan explains that the plain meaning
rule can lead to dishonest conduct (especially in consumer
contracts), Professor Solan also explains that the context rule
invites its own variety of gamesmanship and dishonesty. 122
“A frequent justification for the parol evidence rule . . . is the
desire to improve the resolution of business disputes by
creating a process that is relatively free from unreliable types
of evidence, from the whims of jurors, and from
dishonesty.” 123 “Privileging the written contract serves a
useful function precisely because people do forget what was
said, and because people really do testify dishonestly, or at
least consistently with a self-serving reality that they have
nature, difficult to come by. An opinion is not simply a recounting of the facts
and legal conclusions of the case. An opinion is also a justification of the legal
conclusions reached by the court. As such, courts will naturally report facts
that make their legal conclusions appear reasonable and correct, while
excluding facts that undermine their conclusions.
119. Id. at 939.
120. Id.
121. Kraus & Scott, supra note 108, at 1053. The court did not attempt to
analyze the parties’ alleged oral understanding under equitable doctrines such
as estoppel. Such a claim would likely have failed. It is hard to see how one
could reasonably rely upon an agreement that another party is explicitly
refusing to make part of the written contract.
122. See Solan, supra note 51, at 87–90.
123. Id. at 95 (footnote omitted).
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created in their own minds about events underlying a
litigation.” 124
Professor Solan backs this point with several studies that
demonstrate just how fallible human memory is, especially
where a party has an incentive to remember things a certain
way. “Basically, we remember two seconds of verbatim
speech. What happens with the information after the actual
words cannot be recalled is still a matter of active research
and debate among psychologists of language. But the fact
that the actual words remain with us only briefly is
uncontroversial.” 125 He then describes several studies that
have shown that while we are capable of remembering the
gist of what we hear and read, we are very bad at
remembering the details. 126
To make matters worse, these studies show that our
recollections are very suggestible. Specifically, how we recall
past events is greatly influenced by the way in which we are
asked about them. 127 This problem is greatly magnified in
litigation, where parties are under tremendous economic and
peer pressure to recall events in a manner that is helpful to
their claims:
Imagine, then, what happens when a corporate executive
is interviewed by lawyers about the circumstances
surrounding the execution of a contract that is now in
litigation. Assume that the executive is basically an
honest person, but has only sketchy memory of the events.
The lawyers brief their client on how the case seems to be
coming together and ask—quite in earnest—whether the
executive recalls facts relating to the negotiation that can
be helpful. Much of the time, I submit, that executive’s
memory will be appropriately jogged, and he will testify at
the deposition to the events the lawyers want to hear as
though they had just happened yesterday. This is not
124. Id. at 89–90.
125. Id. at 95.
126. Id. at 96–97 (citing Jacqueline Strunk Sachs, Recognition Memory for
Syntactic and Semantic Aspects of Connected Discourse, 2 PERCEPTION &
PSYCHOPHYSICS 437 (1967); Amina Memon & A. Daniel Yarmey, Earwitness
Recall and Identification: Comparison of the Cognitive Interview and the
Structured Interview, 88 PERCEPTUAL AND MOTOR SKILLS 797 (1999)).
127. See Solan, supra note 51 at 97 (citing Elizabeth F. Loftus & John C.
Palmer, Reconstruction of Automobile Destruction: An Example of the
Interaction Between Language and Memory, 13 J. VERBAL LEARNING & VERBAL
BEHAV. 585 (1974)).
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because he is a liar. It is because he has reconstructed the
story in such a way as to integrate helpful scenarios into
the parts of the story that he actually remembers. I recall
such experiences from my own practice as a litigator, and
I have interviewed corporate lawyers in connection with
this project whose recollections also accord with this
view. 128

Of course, there is also the problem of lying, especially
where such economic and peer pressure is brought to bear.
Professor Solan also points to a growing body of social science
literature suggesting that our system of commercial
exchange, especially in the context of corporate structures,
creates strong incentives for dishonest behavior:
Social psychologists have, over the past decade, identified
incentive systems within the corporate structure that
appear to encourage sharp practices and dishonesty.
Recently, various anthologies of studies about corporate
ethics have been published. Serious acts of wrongdoing
committed by business executives are seen not as the
isolated acts of bad people, but rather as the predictable
consequences of pressures and incentives in today’s
corporate culture. 129

This incentive towards dishonesty in corporate structures
is yet further support for a more restrictive rules regarding
extrinsic evidence in disputes over negotiated commercial
contracts. This is, in essence, the flip side of Professor Solan’s
earlier point that restrictive rules for extrinsic evidence tend
to magnify the power disparities attendant to consumer
contracts of adhesion. A restrictive rule for extrinsic evidence
can restrain a party’s ability to gain advantage through
dishonesty since it is much more difficult to lie about the
language of a written contract than it is to lie about what was
said and done outside of the four corners of the contract.
3. The Context Rule and Extrinsic Evidence at Odds
with Apparent Plain Meaning
Jurisdictions that have adopted the context rule often
also hold that while extrinsic evidence is admissible to shed
light on the intent of the parties—and therefore the meaning
of contract language—it is not admissible to vary or
128. Id.
129. Id. at 98.
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contradict the written terms of a contract. 130
This
construction of the context rule, however, is problematic and
fails to address the problems associated with the context rule
discussed above.
Specifically, the “no varying or
contradicting” rule entails one of two problematic
consequences. Either a) the judge must first determine the
plain meaning of the contract so as to determine whether
certain extrinsic evidence varies or contradicts it, or b) the
rule requires extrinsic evidence to establish what the contract
means in the first place, and accordingly, such extrinsic
evidence could never contradict the meaning of a word or
phrase that it itself has given.
This first notion is but the plain meaning rule in
contextualist clothing, and is not how courts that have
adopted the context rule apply it. 131 If the court can already
determine the plain meaning of a contract such that it can
determine whether extrinsic evidence contradicts the plain
meaning, why consider extrinsic evidence at all? In such a
case, the court already has the contract’s plain meaning.
The second notion creates a problem of circularity. How
can extrinsic evidence, which is used to give the contract
meaning in the first place, ever contradict the very meaning
that the extrinsic evidence has given the contract? For this to
happen, the extrinsic evidence would have to mean both X
and not X, i.e., it would have to vary or contradict itself. In
practice, this second way of applying the “no varying or
contradicting” version of the context rule boils down to an
appeal to the judge’s common sense or gut feeling that certain
language really can only support a certain range of
meaning—a kind of plain meaning light.
As shown in the Hunt Foods case, the context rule can
lead courts to engage in rather violent contortions in order to
show that the extrinsic evidence the court is relying upon
supplements rather than contradicts the language of the
contract.
In Hunt Foods, the court explained that its

130. In re Marriage of Schweitzer, 937 P.2d 1062, 1066 (Wash. 1997)
(explaining that a court cannot “ ‘ add[ ] to, modify[ ], or contradict[ ] the terms
of a written contract, in the absence of fraud, accident, or mistake.’ ” (quoting
Berg v. Hudesman, 801 P.2d 222, 229 (Wash. 1990))).
131. See Berg, 801 P.2d at 230 (“We thus reject the theory that ambiguity in
the meaning of contract language must exist before evidence of the surrounding
circumstances is admissible. Cases to the contrary are overruled.”).
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interpretation that an unconditional option was in fact
conditional was not a contradiction because the condition
merely “lessened” the effect of the option and did not “negate”
It is hard to see the terms “conditional” and
it. 132
“unconditional” as compatible with one another. At the very
least, the tensions within the court’s interpretation of the
option language (especially when the defendant admitted that
the written option was facially unconditional) illustrates a
problem with requiring courts to determine whether extrinsic
evidence contradicts or merely supplements the terms of a
contract. 133
One initially appealing retort to this criticism is that the
no varying or contradicting rule only comes into play where
the court is choosing between the various possible meanings
of a word or phrase. But this cannot be what is meant in
jurisdictions that apply the context rule.
In such
jurisdictions, extrinsic evidence is admissible to determine in
the first place the various possible meanings that a word or
phrase might bear—i.e., extrinsic evidence must be
considered when determining whether the word or phrase is
ambiguous in the first instance. 134 Evidence used to establish
that a word or phrase is ambiguous could never contradict the
word or phrase in question since that evidence has itself
established the range of possible meanings. Put another way,
the evidence that defines what a word means logically cannot
contradict what a word means.
4. While the Context Rule Looks to the Parties’
Subjective Intent, Divining the Parties’ Subjective
Intent Is Problematic
Under the context rule, courts look to extrinsic evidence
to determine the subjective intent of the parties, but as
explained below, determining the parties’ subjective intent is
Even courts
highly problematic for several reasons. 135
132. Hunt Foods & Indus., Inc. v. Doliner, 270 N.Y.S.2d 937, 940 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1966) (“To be inconsistent the term must contradict or negate a term of the
writing. A term or condition which has a lesser effect is provable.”).
133. See Schwartz & Scott, Contract Theory, supra note 1, at 571 n.58.
134. See Admiral Builders Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. S. River Landing, Inc., 502
A.2d 1096, 1099 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1986).
135. FARNSWORTH, supra note 1, at § 7.9. While Farnsworth acknowledges
that parties usually do not have a shared intent, he nonetheless describes the
“court’s task” in such cases as “applying a standard of reasonableness to
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applying the context rule have recognized that looking to the
subjective intent of the parties is not workable—at least in
regard to whether the parties have formed a contract. In
complex negotiated commercial contracts, it is difficult to
assign a single intent to the language of a contract that was
negotiated and drafted by numerous individuals on each side
of the contract. If parties are litigating the interpretation of a
contract in good faith, then those parties must not have had a
single intent, at least in regard to the subject matter of their
dispute.
i.

The Context Rule’s Focus on Subjective Intent Is
Incompatible with the Objective Theory of
Contracts

It is a long held assumption in the law of contracts that
what ought to govern the interpretation of a contract is the
intent of the parties. As a 1795 case from the Supreme Court
of North Carolina held: “The true intent of the parties to be
regulated by that contract, shall not be defeated and justice
overturned, so long as any evidence remains which throws
any glimmering of light on that subject, from which a jury
may be enabled to infer the real state of the transaction.” 136
This is especially true of courts that apply the context
rule, which has as its primary justification the notion that
extrinsic evidence of the context in which the parties entered
into their contract is essential to properly identify the parties’
intent. 137
The second concept that underlies our analysis is this
state’s so-called “context rule.” . . . We include “the subject
matter and objective of the contract, all circumstances
surrounding its formation, the subsequent acts and
conduct of the parties, statements made by the parties in
preliminary negotiations, and usage of trade and course of

determine which party’s intention is to be carried out . . . .” Id. This Article’s
critique of the parties’ intent goes further by questioning whether the court can
determine the parties’ subjective intent at all, regardless of whether the parties
had the same intent or not.
136. Ingram v. Hall, 2 N.C. (1 Hayw.) 193, 207 (N.C. 1795).
137. While courts applying the plain meaning rule recite the same truism
that the touchstone of contract interpretation is the intent of the parties, such
courts focus on the language of the contract as the best indicator of the parties’
intent. See Tallmadge Bros., Inc. v. Iroquois Gas Transmission Sys., L.P., 746
A.2d 1277, 1289 (Conn. 2000).
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dealings.” This approach permits us to then “discover the
intent of the parties based on their real meeting of the
minds, as opposed to insufficient written expression of
their intent.” 138

Here, the court is not referring to objective
manifestations of intent. 139 The court is looking for the
parties’ actual, subjective, and presumably unitary intent
(even if it will not allow the parties to testify to their
subjective understandings directly). Indeed, courts almost
universally invoke the intent of the parties as the touchstone
of all contract interpretation. How close courts come to
matching their interpretations to what the parties actually
subjectively intended is the barometer by which courts
applying the context rule judge their success or failure in
interpreting a contract.
The notion that parties even have a single unified intent
at the moment of execution is also not axiomatic. And if
parties frequently do not have such a unified intent, even
where they both knowingly and fully agree to the language of
a particular contract, then the endeavor of determining the
parties’ intent would, in such cases, be impossible.
Even while seeking the parties’ subjective intent, courts
recognize that determining a shared subjective intent among
the parties to a contract is problematic:
Article 2 does not, however, require a “true ‘meeting of the
minds.’ ” Rather, the objective theory of contracts is used.
The objective theory stresses an outward manifestation of
assent made by one party to the other party. The parties’
objective intent and what a reasonably prudent person
would have believed from the actions or words of the
parties is analyzed. 140
138. Carpenter v. Remtech, Inc., 226 P.3d 159, 161–62 (Wash. Ct. App. 2010)
(emphasis added) (citations omitted) (quoting Berg v. Hudesman, 801 P.2d 222,
228 (Wash. 1990); Tjart v. Smith Barney, Inc., 28 P.3d 823, 828–29 (Wash. Ct.
App. 2001)).
139. See also Michael L. Boyer, Contract as Text: Interpretive Overlap in Law
and Literature, 12 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 167, 171 (2003) (“The parol evidence
rule is characterized by two schools of thought: the mechanical conception of
Professor Williston, emphasizing the agreement and its plain meaning, and the
modern approach of Professor Corbin, emphasizing the parties’ intentions and
use of extrinsic evidence to reveal these intentions.”) (citing Stephen F. Ross &
Daniel Tranen, The Modern Parol Evidence Rule and Its Implications for New
Textualist Statutory Interpretation, 87 GEO. L.J. 195, 199–207 (1998)).
140. Dean Mach. Co. v. Union Bank, 106 S.W.3d 510, 521 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003)
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Indeed, at least when it comes to issues of contract
formation, courts now universally hold that it is not the
parties’ actual subjective agreement that matters, but instead
it is the parties’ outward expressions of agreement to a
written document that determines whether the agreement is
binding.
Even in jurisdictions that have adopted the context rule,
courts have all but done away with the notion that parties
must have a subjective meeting of the minds in order to form
a contract. As Justice Friendly quoted Justice Holmes in the
Frigaliment Importing Co. case, “the making of a contract
depends not on the agreement of two minds in one intention,
but on the agreement of two sets of external signs—not on the
parties’ having meant the same thing but on their having said
the same thing.” 141 As Justice Posner recognized, “[m]ost
contract disputes arise because the parties did not foresee
and provide for some contingency that has now
materialized—so there was no meeting of minds on the
matter at issue—yet such disputes are treated as disputes
over contractual meaning, not as grounds for rescinding the
contract . . . .” 142 Thus, even jurisdictions that apply the
context rule when interpreting contracts tacitly recognize the
problems with relying upon the parties’ subjective intent
when they apply the objective theory of contracts to formation
issues.
Courts applying the context rule deal with the
contradiction between the objective theory of contracts and
the search for the parties’ subjective intent by applying the
objective theory of contracts to determine whether a contract
was formed, but then determining what the contract means
by reference to the parties subjective intent. 143 Courts do so
by invoking notions like the parties’ actual intent or true
(citations omitted). The apparent conflict between the court’s explication of the
context rule in Carpenter and the court’s explication of the context rule in Dean
illustrates an insoluble conflict between the objective theory of contract and the
context rule. The objective theory of contract seeks apparent meaning (based
upon what a reasonably prudent person would interpret) while the context rule
seeks subjective meaning (i.e., what the parties in fact intended).
141. Frigaliment Importing Co. v. B.N.S. Int’l Sales Corp., 190 F. Supp. 116,
117 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) (citation omitted).
142. Colfax Envelope Corp. v. Local No. 458-3M, Chi. Graphic Commc’n Int’l
Union, 20 F.3d 750, 752 (7th Cir. 1994).
143. Compare Carpenter, 226 P.3d at 161–62, with Argo Welded Prods., Inc.
v. J.T. Ryerson Steel & Sons, Inc., 528 F. Supp. 583, 592 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
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meeting of the minds. 144 While this procedure allows courts
to apply these rules consistently, it does not resolve the
inherent contradiction between a rule that admits that
contracts can be formed without a subjective meeting of the
minds, and a rule that requires courts to seek out a subjective
meeting of the minds when interpreting the same contract.
Indeed, putting to one side the possibility that either party is
lying, the very fact that a dispute has arisen suggests that
the parties did not have a shared subjective intent, at least in
regard to the subject matter of their dispute.
ii. The Realities of Negotiating and the Illusion of
Unitary Intent
Given the nature of how complex commercial contracts
are negotiated and the incentives of the parties to jockey for
advantage, there is good reason to think that parties often do
not have a unified intent when they agree to sign a complex
commercial contract, at least as to those details that end up
being litigated.
First, complex commercial contracts are not simple
agreements between two individuals reduced to writing.
Such contracts are almost always entered into between
corporations controlled by varying numbers of officers,
directors, managers, etc. The individual that signs a contract
may or may not be among the several individuals who
negotiated the contract for one side. Even the individuals on
one side of a contract who all agree to its written terms may
not all have a single unitary intent regarding exactly what
those terms mean. Perhaps different individuals, even on one
side of the contract, drafted different portions of it. And
perhaps those responsible for agreeing to the contract were
not the ones who drafted it. In such cases, contracts begin to
look less like expressions of shared underlying intent, and
more like agreements to be bound by particular language.
Second, negotiating commercial contracts is not a
communal activity, but rather a competitive sport. Such
negotiations may not be a truly zero sum game where one
party wins, and the other party loses. There are certainly
provisions in commercial contracts that both parties want and
both will benefit from. However, the goal of any form of
144. See Argo Welded, 528 F. Supp. at 591–92.
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commercial negotiation in a competitive capitalist economy is
to capture the greatest profit—usually at the expense of the
other party to the negotiation. Under such circumstances,
each party does not agree to contractual language simply to
set into writing their agreement. They agree to language
because they believe that it will provide them with an
advantage should a dispute arise. As to any given provision,
both parties cannot be right.
For example, the parties to a fixed-price construction
contract might agree that, should the owner terminate its
contract with the contractor at any point prior to final
completion, the contractor is entitled to a prorated share of
the fixed-price based upon the percentage of completion. The
contractor might have agreed to this term believing that it
would be interpreted to mean percentage completion based
upon the amount spent to date on the project compared to the
amount the contractor would have to spend to finish it. The
owner, on the other hand, might have agreed to this term
believing that percentage of completion is the ratio of the
amount the owner has paid the contractor to the amount the
owner would have to pay to complete the project. The parties
might have agreed to this language, not because they actually
reached an agreement as to what this term means, but
because each party believed it could win a dispute over what
this term means. This does not mean that the parties failed
to reach an agreement, but rather, that they calculated the
effects of their agreement differently. 145
Parties negotiating a commercial contract are not simply
negotiating about the subject matter of the contract. The
language of the contract itself is part of what is being
bargained for. A party may agree to take a lower payment in
return for language that the party believes will advantage it
should a dispute arise. Parties will also often horse trade
contract language—“I do not like section 2.B. of the contract,
but we can keep it if you agree to this new provision in section
3, which we would like.” Here, parties are not concerned
simply with setting their intent into writing, but with getting
language into the contract that they can rely upon and that
145. Calling such a contract ambiguous does not save the context rule from
its reliance upon the parties’ subjective intent. If the parties believed that the
term would be interpreted differently, the intent of the parties is of no help and
extrinsic evidence of the subjective intent of the parties is irrelevant.
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they believe will benefit them should a dispute arise.
5. For Communication to Occur, the Meaning of
Language Cannot be Grounded in the Intent of
the Parties
As discussed above in Part III.A.4, courts applying the
context rule see evidence of the parties’ subjective intent as
necessary to interpret what a contract means. But there are
good reasons to be skeptical about whether a contract’s
meaning must be determined by direct reference to the
subjective intent of the parties. 146 As Professor Ricks argues,
the contextualist attack upon the plain meaning rule is
flawed because it presumes that the meaning of a contract
must be the intent of the parties. 147
First, the judges assert that plain meaning could only be
found by reading a document if words had inherent
meaning, or absolute and constant referents. But they do
not, the argument goes. Second, the opinions claim that
the meaning of words is actually the thoughts and
intentions of the speaker, or perhaps the speaker and
hearer. No written contract could ever adequately reveal
these. Plain meaning is therefore impossible. This claim
is left irrefuted in the casebooks and contract law
literature . . . . 148
....
But the claim that plain meaning is impossible is false, as
are its premises. . . . [W]ords cannot be the thoughts and
intentions of the speaker, hearer, or anyone else
. . . .[P]lain meaning does not require that words have
“inherent meaning” or “absolute and constant referents.”
Plain meaning is possible and occurs quite apart from
reference or another theory of inherent meaning. Plain
meaning rests instead on our unreflective, public,
conventional practice of language use. 149

In other words, it is how words are used publically by
convention that comes to define their meaning, not what any
146. Val D. Ricks, The Possibility of Plain Meaning: Wittgenstein and the
Contract Precedents, 56 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 767, 769 (2008) (“Drawing on the
philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein, . . . the meaning of words cannot be the
thoughts and intentions of the speaker, hearer, or anyone else.”).
147. Id. at 768.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 769.
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particular user intends. For communication to be possible,
meaning must be based upon public and shared
conventions. 150 “The thoughts and intents of the speaker and
writer, hearer and listener, are irrelevant to the meaning of
language. Meaning is not subjective and personal. Instead,
the meaning of language is necessarily public and objective.
The meaning lies in the consistent, conventional patterns of
our usage.” 151
A language that has meaning by reference only to what
the speaker or the hearer intends, in fact, has no meaning at
all. 152 Professor Ricks summarizes Wittgenstein’s argument
to this effect as follows:
The difficulty with such a language is that no “criterion for
correctness” for the use of it exists. Language, to have
meaning, must be used consistently. (Wittgenstein’s way
to express this consistency was to say that language is
used “according to rule” . . . .)[.] Moreover, some way to
check the consistency must exist so that users of the
language know whether language is being used
meaningfully or not. But no method exists to keep a
wholly private language consistent, or to check it for
consistency. 153

This observation, that for communication to be possible,
the meaning must be based upon public and shared
conventions, undermines not only the context rule, but also
the plain meaning rule to the extent the plain meaning rule
excludes extrinsic evidence of the public and conventional
meaning of words or phrases.
Context is essential to
meaning, but only to the extent that such context is public
and shared. 154
Even when courts apply the plain meaning rule, they are
not discerning the meaning outside of any context. Of course,
such a thing would be impossible. Even when courts do not
utilize extrinsic evidence, judges bring to a text all of their
internalized rules for common usage—rules of grammar,
150. Id. at 784.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 785–86 (citing LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL
INVESTIGATIONS ¶ 202 (G.E.M. Anscombe trans., Basil Blackwell Ltd. 3d ed.
1986) (1953)).
153. Id. at 785 (footnote omitted) (citing WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 152, ¶
258).
154. See id.
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syntax, etc.—through which they interpret the contract, 155
even when purportedly limited to the four corners of the
contract.
This phenomenon is best typified by courts’
frequent referral to an English dictionary—a document
outside the contract itself—even when applying the plain
meaning rule. 156
Take for example the famous case of Frigaliment
Importing Co. v. B.N.S. International Sales Corp., where the
court, in first determining whether the word “chicken” is
ambiguous, looked to the dictionary definition of the term. 157
The issue is, what is chicken? Plaintiff says “chicken”
means a young chicken, suitable for broiling and frying.
Defendant says “chicken” means any bird of that genus
that meets contract specifications on weight and quality,
including what it calls “stewing chicken” and plaintiff
pejoratively terms “fowl”.
Dictionaries give both
meanings, as well as some others not relevant here. 158

Contrary to the contextualist critique of the plain
meaning rule, it is possible to consistently assign meaning to
words and phrases in a contract based upon the text of the
contract alone and the tools available to courts applying the
plain meaning rule. The question is whether the plain
meaning rule (or the context rule or the public meaning rule
suggested by this Article) will assist courts in interpreting
contracts in a way that reflects the purposes for which parties
enter into contracts. As explained below in Part IV.B., that
purpose must include the ability to predictably constrain
another party’s behavior. And if this indeed is an essential
purpose of contracts, the observation that communication is
only possible via public and shared conventions for what
words mean entails that contracts must be interpreted
according to such shared and public conventions if contracts
are to serve their essential function. Put simply, if parties
155. Id. at 801–02 (“The context of the plain meaning rule includes the
contract itself, whatever of the commercial context that can be discerned from
the contract, the learning and background of the judge, and the arguments that
litigants offer regarding whether the language is clear. . . . The grammatical
rules by which language has meaning, even plain meaning, can function in this
setting, in this context.”).
156. Frigaliment Importing Co. v. B.N.S. Int’l Sales Corp., 190 F. Supp. 116,
117 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
157. Id.
158. Id.
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cannot rely upon public and shared conventions for meaning
they cannot predictably constrain others’ behavior, and this
undermines the purpose for which parties enter into
contracts.
IV. A PROPOSED RULE FOR NEGOTIATED COMMERCIAL
CONTRACTS
So far, this Article has addressed problems with both the
plain meaning rule and the context rule, which govern when
and what kinds of extrinsic evidence are admissible to
interpret a contract that appears unambiguous on its face.
The plain meaning rule is flawed (at least in its claims that
words have absolute meaning) because the language of a
contract can only have meaning in context. Furthermore, the
plain meaning rule relies upon judges’ subjective
preconceptions regarding what the terms in a contract mean.
Looking only to the language of the contract itself, and
holding the parties to it, can also allow more sophisticated
parties to take advantage of less sophisticated parties.
Finally, the language of the contract alone cannot shed light
on what the parties to the contract actually intended, and it is
the intent of the parties that defines what a contract means
(or so contextualists argue).
But the context rule is problematic in its own way. Many
kinds of extrinsic evidence are inherently unreliable. Parties
misremember and parties lie, and it is much easier to fake or
misrepresent extrinsic evidence than it is to fake or
misrepresent the language of the contract itself.
Furthermore, there are good reasons to doubt that divining
the intent of the parties, especially in complex commercial
contracts, is possible. Parties often do not have a shared
intent regarding the matters or factual circumstances that
end up being litigated, but instead only agree to be bound to
the particular language of their contract. This is especially
true in contracts between commercial entities, where various
individuals negotiate, approve, and sign contracts even on
behalf of a single party—thus making a unitary intent even
more problematic.
More fundamentally, in order for
communication to occur, the meaning of words or phrases
cannot be based upon the intent of the party stating them,
but instead derives from the way the terms of the contract are
publically and conventionally used within language.
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The notion that meaning, in communication generally
and in contracts in particular, must be based upon shared
and public conventions of usage provides the basis for a rule
that addresses the problems with the strong forms of both the
plain meaning rule and the context rule. If the meaning of a
word, phrase, or text must be based upon shared and public
conventions, then evidence aimed at the subjective intent of
one or both of the parties should not be what courts look to in
order to interpret contract language. Rather, evidence of the
shared and public conventions for how a word or phrase is
used in language ought to govern how a court interprets a
word or phrase. The public meaning rule allows parties to
submit evidence of such shared and public conventions at the
initial stage of contract interpretation, while excluding
evidence offered to show the subjective intent of one or more
of the parties, evidence that, as discussed above, is highly
problematic.
This Article’s response to the contextualist critique of the
plain meaning rule is to untie meaning from both the
subjective notions of a judge (under a strict plain meaning
rule) and from extrinsic evidence of the subjective intent of
the parties (under the context rule). Instead, meaning must
be fastened to the public and shared conventions for the
usage of words and phrases within language, which courts
can determine through evidence of how a word or phrase in a
contract is, in fact, publically and conventionally used.
The rule proposed in this Article would be applied by a
court as follows: When interpreting the meaning of a contract,
the court would first look to whether the contract has a
single, unambiguous meaning in light of the language of the
contract itself. In addition, the court would also look to
evidence of how the words or phrases in the contract are
publically and conventionally used in language, such as trade
usage. The court would also require each party to produce
limited biographical extrinsic evidence that the parties are
members of a group that employs the usage of the term or
phrase, which the party advocates. Put another way, the
parties, at this initial stage, must submit extrinsic evidence
to prove that their proposed usage is relevant, and/or that the
other parties’ proposed usage is not relevant. Courts at this
stage would not admit evidence of what one or both of the
parties subjectively understood the words or phrases in the
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contract to mean. If the contract is still ambiguous, the court
would resort to equitable principles to determine a fair
outcome, and allow any extrinsic evidence relevant to that
endeavor.
The result of the public meaning rule proposed by this
Article is that after the initial stage of contract
interpretation, courts will be left with a definite list of the
possible meanings that the word or phrase at issue may bear,
i.e., those interpretations that are supported by evidence of
what the word or phrase in fact means in language. Words
and phrases can only have a certain range of conventional
meanings within a particular group of speakers, otherwise
communication would be impossible.
Under the public
meaning rule, parties will not be able to present evidence that
the word or phrase at issue has a meaning outside of the
boundaries of usage relevant to the parties. 159
This Article is not concerned with the order of preference
courts apply to the various types of extrinsic evidence, per se.
Rather, this Article argues that courts should not consider
certain types of extrinsic evidence at the initial stage where
the court determines whether a contract is ambiguous. The
hierarchy of extrinsic evidence is important under any
interpretive theory that looks to multiple categories of
extrinsic evidence at any particular phase. However, the
thesis of this Article is that only one category of extrinsic
evidence—evidence of the public and shared meaning of a
word or phrase—should be admitted during the first phase of
contract interpretation where the court determines whether
the contract is ambiguous. The practical effect of the rule
proposed in this Article is that evidence of usage will be
privileged over other forms of extrinsic evidence. But the
order in which courts apply categories of extrinsic evidence
other than usage (only after determining that a contract is
ambiguous) is beyond the scope of this Article.

159. While, as discussed above, courts that apply the context rule generally
also hold that extrinsic evidence cannot be used to vary or contradict the terms
of the contract, the public meaning rule provides a procedure for putting this
notion into practice that is far more concrete and less reflexive. See infra Part
IV.A. The public meaning rule is grounded in more than the court’s reflexive
notions of whether a purported definition is simply “beyond the pale.”
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A. Example Categories: Trade Usage Versus Course of
Performance and Course of Dealing
There are numerous categories of extrinsic evidence that
parties can submit in contract litigation. They include
evidence of the parties’ course of dealing, evidence of the
parties’ course of performance, evidence of the parties’ precontract negotiations, evidence of the parties’ communications
post-contract, evidence of internal communications by one of
the parties to the contract, evidence of trade usage, and so on.
Rather than address each of these categories, this Section
addresses a few in particular as examples of extrinsic
evidence that are relevant to the public and conventional
meaning of words in language and examples that are not.
1. Evidence of Public and Conventional Usage
Unlike course of dealing and course of performance,
evidence of public and conventional usage (such as trade
usage as described in Article 1 of the Uniform Commercial
Code 160 and the Restatement of Contracts (Second) 161) is
evidence of the very conventions that make communication
possible. Courts frequently refer to dictionary definitions
when attempting to determine the meaning of contract
terms 162 and reliance upon a dictionary is appropriate given
the dictionary’s functions as a guide to common usage.
But the dictionary is not the final word on the proper
usage of terms. A dictionary is an attempt to catalogue public
usage. It does not itself define public usage.
A dictionary, it is vital to observe, never says what
meaning a word must bear in a particular context. Nor
does it ever purport to say this. An unabridged dictionary
is simply an historical record, not necessarily all-inclusive,
of the meanings which words in fact have borne . . . . The
editors make up this record by collecting examples of uses
of the word to be defined, studying each use in context,
and then forming a judgment about the meaning in that
context. 163

160.
161.
162.
163.

U.C.C. § 1-205(2) (1978).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 202(5) (1979).
See, e.g., Frigaliment Importing Co., 190 F. Supp. at 117.
HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC
PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1190 (William N.
Eskridge, Jr. & Phillip P. Frickey eds., 1994).
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The dictionary is a starting point, not an end point, in the
court’s search for what a word or phrase means. Evidence of
trade usage, usage within a particular region, usage among
speakers of a particular dialect, etc. allows parties to
supplement dictionary definitions and the judge’s
understanding of common usage with evidence of other
particular public usages of a term among particular groups,
specifically groups to which one or more of the parties
belong. 164
For example, the common usage of the term “hacker”
among computer programmers is “an expert at programming
and solving problems with a computer.” 165 The common
usage of the term “hacker” outside of this subgroup of
computer programmers, however, is a person who uses a
computer to gain unauthorized access to data. 166 It is
impossible for a court to determine which meaning is
appropriate for a given contract unless the court is a) aware
of both usages of the term, and b) can determine whether the
contract is properly situated within the particular subgroup
of computer programmers or is properly situated within the
subgroup of non-computer programmers.
To solve the first problem, parties must be able to submit
evidence of common usages of the term. For example, an
English dictionary lists both of the above definitions. But
what if an American-English dictionary only listed the second
164. In response to this notion that meaning derives from the common usage
of a terms as employed by a group (as opposed to the intent of the parties), one
might ask: why can’t the parties be considered a “group” with its own
conventions of usage?
First, parties enter into contracts, not just to communicate with each other,
but to communicate with a third-party arbiter should a dispute between the
parties arise. For this reason, as discussed in Part IV.2, it would be irrational
for parties to use language in an idiosyncratic way, such as attempting to create
a private language and then drafting a contract in that private language.
Second, for language to communicate, there must be public and shared
conventions of usage. Without such an outside point of reference, it is
impossible to give meaning to the language they hear or read. Ricks, supra note
146, at 785 (citing WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 152, ¶ 258).
Where two parties have a dispute over the proper usage of a term, there is no
way to decide between the two parties’ positions without some reference to an
outside independent standard of usage. Without some independent “criterion
for correctness,” there is no basis for preferring one party’s usage over another’s.
165. Hacker Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, http://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/hacker (last visited Sept. 28, 2012).
166. See id.
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meaning and the parties are both companies in the computer
programming industry?
In order to educate the judge
regarding the additional common convention for usage, each
of the parties should be allowed to submit evidence of a public
usage outside the definition set forth in the dictionary. This
is where extrinsic evidence of usage, such as trade usage,
comes in.
Once the judge establishes the range of public usages, the
judge can then determine which public usage is appropriate
to the particular contract in question. Often, this is quite
easy within the four corners of the contract itself. If a
computer programming company enters into a contract with a
temp agency that specializes in computer programmers, it is
clear that the appropriate custom of usage is that common to
computer programmers. The definition of “hacker” as “a
person who uses a computer to gain unauthorized access to
data” would not be a public usage among computer
programmers and thus would not be the basis for that term’s
meaning.
This example raises an important issue that would
require courts to expand evidence of public usage to include
evidence that a party belongs to a particular group that
employs the particular usage when the contract itself does not
suggest the appropriate usage group. Using the above
example, a party relying upon trade usage to define a term
would have to show not just that an alternative public usage
exists, but also that the party is part of a group that employs
the particular trade usage. For the extrinsic evidence of
usage to be relevant, the party would have to show that the
particular usage purported is a common usage in the group to
which that party belongs. It would make little sense for a
court to consider extrinsic evidence of what a word means in
British English if neither party is British or resides in
Britain. Such biographical information regarding the parties
is not evidence of the parties’ intent, but instead is evidence
that the usage purported by a party is relevant.
2. Course of Dealing and Course of Performance
Unlike evidence of public meaning, which is grounded
the very conventions that give words their ability
communicate meaning, evidence of parties’ prior conduct
very difficult to associate with a limited range of meanings

in
to
is
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intentions. As discussed below, any particular act or series of
actions is very frequently compatible with numerous
contradictory purported intentions on the part of the actor.
The meaning of a phrase that parties agree to be bound by,
put into writing, and sign their names to, can be bounded in a
way that the meaning underlying a party’s actions cannot.
i.

Course of Dealing and Course of Performance Are
Not Determinative of Meaning

Evidence of the parties’ course of performance and course
of dealing is problematic, not only because it is evidence of
subjective intent, which cannot be what gives words their
meaning when people communicate, but also because such
evidence is frequently compatible with multiple subjective
intentions. Courts that rely upon such evidence look at
parties’ course of dealing and course of performance in order
to determine what the parties intended, and by this
determination of what the parties intended, such courts
define what the contract means.
But a party’s actions in performing a contract are often
compatible with numerous contradictory intentions, and thus
cannot provide a basis for meaning. Take the following
simplified example: If I order halibut, but the waiter instead
returns with beef, and neither I nor the waiter object, and
then I pay the amount listed next to the word “halibut” (or
the amount next to the word “beef” for that matter), it is by
no means clear that the waiter and I meant or understood the
terms “halibut” and/or “beef” in the same way. I could have
simply had in mind that by uttering the word “halibut” I
would receive something to eat, or I could have understood
that I would receive a dark sanguineous meat as opposed to a
white flaky meat—and so also for the waiter’s understanding.
This same transaction could happen a dozen times in exactly
the same way, and there still would be no way of knowing
what exactly either of us meant or understood.
But let us say that the thirteenth time I order halibut,
and the waiter returns with the same dark sanguineous meat
as the last twelve times, I object and say “this is not halibut,
this is beef and I will not pay for it.” On what basis could I
say that I am right or I am wrong other than by virtue of
conventions of public meaning outside of the course of dealing
between me and the waiter? As described above, there is no
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way to tell what I meant each of the twelve previous times I
ordered halibut, or even that I meant to distinguish between
light flaky meat and a dark sanguineous meat each time I
ordered. Nor is there any way to tell what the waiter
understood me to mean. The only way to make such a
judgment is by reference to some outside standard of public
meaning, which cannot be logically derived from the parties’
course of dealing. As discussed above, one cannot assume
that the waiter and I have merely swapped the general usage
of the term “halibut” with the general usage of the term “beef”
since our conduct is consistent with numerous other
intentions.
One might think “well this is silly, clearly you meant
‘beef’ when you said ‘halibut.’ Sure, it is possible that you
meant ‘something to eat,’ but that certainly is not what any
reasonable observer would possibly think you meant.” The
problem with this criticism is that one’s intuition that I must
have simply meant “beef” when I said “halibut” is itself based
upon common conventions of usage.
In this case, the
convention is: “when one orders from a menu one is asking for
a particular thing, not just something to eat.” This is not
something that is baked into the word “halibut” but is
something that is imported into the word based upon
conventions of use. One cannot save the notion that meaning
is grounded in the intent of the speaker (or the hearer)
without reference to public customs and conventions for how
words are used.
ii. Course of Dealing, Course of Performance, and
Accidental Terms
When parties enter into a contract, they agree to be
bound by the terms set forth in the contract. But when
parties act a certain way, either over the course of several
contracts or in the course of performing a single contract,
parties are not necessarily intending to create the terms of
the contract to which they agreed to be bound. For example,
say I enter into a contract with a tenant that calls for $1000
rent at the beginning of each month. But say that for eight
months, those payments are made anywhere from the first of
the month through the fourteenth of the month. In such a
case, under the context rule, evidence of the parties’ course of
performance could be used to show that what the parties
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really meant, and therefore what the contract means, is that
payments could be made up to two weeks into the month.
This is problematic because, as discussed above, the fact
that the payments were up to two weeks late and nobody
objected is consistent with multiple intentions regarding the
language of the contract. I might accept these payments,
which I consider late, not because I in fact intended the
contract to mean that payment must be made within two
weeks of the first of every month, but merely because I do not
yet wish to go to the trouble of litigating the issue. I might
also merely be cutting the other party slack because I
understand that they are in financial difficulty, but have no
intention of waiving my right to declare a breach at any point
(a right I have always maintained I have).
If the court entertains evidence of my accepting late
payments (course of performance) as an objective
manifestation of my intent, the court is very possibly reading
an intent that I never in fact had into the meaning of the
language of the contract. If evidence of course of performance
is admissible in the first instance to determine the meaning of
a contract, and if I am not careful, I could end up
inadvertently altering the meaning that courts will assign to
the contract.
Not only does this seem to undermine the very endeavor
that courts claim to be pursuing—discerning the intent of the
parties—but it can also lead to increased transaction costs as
parties are forced to carefully monitor their conduct so as not
to create extrinsic evidence that will be used to give contracts
meaning that the acting party may never have intended.
As discussed below, there is certainly a place for evidence
of the parties’ course of performance and course of dealing,
but there is not a place for that in the interpretation of what
the parties’ contract means. Rather, there are circumstances
where our legal system privileges notions of fairness over
what contracts actually say. And it is in those types of cases
that evidence of the parties’ course of performance and course
of dealing should be admitted.
By tying meaning to public conventions of usage, rather
than some notion of absolute meaning, the proposal in this
Article takes the notion of plain meaning off its platonic
pedestal and puts it back into the earthly realm of
convention. Many of the problems with formalist concepts
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such as plain meaning stem from the fact that those formalist
concepts claim to be describing some objective underlying
reality, when in fact, they are vehicles for incorporating
conventions. Those conventions may have within them
notions that, upon reflection, appear to be unjust or unfair.
Examples of this include the concerns raised by Professor
Solan and the discussion above regarding consumer contracts
of adhesion. 167 But a view of contract meaning that treats
meaning not as absolute but as conventional, will allow courts
to more readily put conventions regarding meaning aside and
focus on equity where our moral intuitions call for it. Or at
least, the proposal in this Article will force courts to make a
choice between the ideals of predictability and fairness
explicit.
iii. An Alternative Explanation for the Intuitive
Appeal of Course of Dealing and Course of
Performance
There is something intuitively appealing about evidence
of what the parties have done in prior agreements and how
they have carried out the contract over which they currently
have a dispute. One explanation for this intuitive appeal is
that such evidence reflects what the parties actually meant
by the words of their contract, as compared to what they
merely said or wrote. Actions speak louder than words. But
as discussed above, there are numerous situations where
parties’ course of dealing or course of performance may not
reflect their intent regarding what their contract means.
I suspect, rather, that the intuitive appeal of such
extrinsic evidence is bound up with commonly held notions of
fairness, more particularly embodied in equitable concepts
such as detrimental reliance.
The application of such
concepts has little to do with enforcing the commercial
expectations of the parties based upon the words they put
into writing, and thus has little to do with making the law of
contracts more predictable. Rather, such equitable concepts
are intuitively appealing because we as a society are willing
to give up a certain degree of certainty that our contract will
be enforced as written in return for a degree of fairness. For
example, parties who lead others to believe that there will be
167. Solan, supra note 51, at 90, 106–14.
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no consequences for a breach should not be allowed to claim a
breach and collect damages, regardless of what the contract
says.
Indeed, many jurisdictions explicitly look to course of
performance as evidence supporting a claim for estoppel or
waiver, as opposed to evidence of what contract terms mean.
This use of course of performance evidence in support of a
defense against the terms of a contract illustrates the point
that course of performance and course of dealing are
intuitively appealing as a basis for disregarding a contract,
not for interpreting it. As the court in PC Com, Inc. v.
Proteon, Inc. explained, “parties can generally change a
contract by a modifying agreement, by a course of
performance, or by estoppel.” 168 Here, the court all but makes
explicit the notion that course of performance is not evidence
of what the parties’ contract means, but is evidence that the
court should disregard the contract’s meaning on equitable
grounds. 169 The court also addresses the doctrine of waiver by
course of performance, which is an even more explicit use of
course of performance to nullify a contractual provision on
equitable grounds. 170 Waiver, by definition, is a claim that a
party has abandoned a contractual right. 171 A waiver defense
asserts that evidence of course of performance should be used
to directly contradict the language of the contract, not to
interpret it. 172
Similar equitable notions also explain the intuitive
appeal of other forms of extrinsic evidence typically
associated with the intent of the parties, such as evidence of a
prior or collateral agreement. As discussed above, Professor
Solan gives the example of a particular kind of promissory
note transaction where one company convinces another to
sign a promissory note for outstanding amounts due, payable
on demand, but orally promises not to execute for a particular
168. PC Com, Inc. v. Proteon, Inc., 946 F. Supp. 1125, 1130 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)
(emphasis added) (citation omitted).
169. See id.
170. Id. at 1133.
171. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1717 (9th ed. 2009).
172. See, e.g., Cent. Ill. Pub. Serv. Co. v. Atlas Minerals, Inc., 965 F. Supp.
1162, 1175 (C.D. Ill. 1997) (“As far as the termination date is concerned, the
contract was neither ambiguous nor incomplete. Thus, course of performance is
only relevant to the extent it is evidence of a waiver.” (citation omitted)), aff’d,
146 F.3d 448 (7th Cir. 1998).
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period of time. 173 Professor Solan notes that under a strict
plain meaning rule, the prior oral promise is not
enforceable. 174 But again, this has little to do with what the
terms of a promissory note “payable upon demand” mean.
Common English usage is not equivocal that such language
means that the creditor can foreclose the debt any time she
chooses. The extrinsic evidence of a prior agreement has
nothing to do with what the parties’ contract means but
instead has everything to do with fairness. It would be unfair
to allow a party to induce another to sign an agreement based
upon a promise and then renege on that promise.
B. Why the Public Meaning Rule Better Reflects the Purpose
of Contracts
People use language for a multitude of reasons. They use
language to state facts and inform (“You have a stain on your
shirt.”). They use language to perform actions (“I declare
war.” “The meeting is adjourned.” “I offer. . . . I accept.”).
They use metaphors to convey subtle abstract notions (“Juliet
is the sun.” 175 “Now is the winter of our discontent.” 176).
Why do people use language to enter into contracts?
While there may be numerous ancillary reasons, the primary
purpose of a contract is to control a future state of affairs by
invoking the coercive power of the state. Put another way,
people enter into contracts to ensure that other people will do
particular things at or by a particular time. The explanation
for why this must be so has to do with the role that promises
backed by coercive force play in coordinating human activity.
Take, for example, the project of building a home. Now it
is theoretically possible for me to build a structure without
relying upon promises backed by coercive force. I could go to
a Home Depot and buy the lumber, nails, drywall, plumbing
materials, electrical materials, etc., paying cash on the spot
(for purposes of this example, I will even allow an instant
exchange of money for stuff not to count as a contract). I
could then buy the required excavating machines and go
about building the structure all by myself. This would
presuppose a vast amount of construction experience, which I
173.
174.
175.
176.

Solan, supra note 51, at 112–13.
Id. at 113.
WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, ROMEO AND JULIET act 2, sc. 2.
WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, RICHARD III act 1, sc.1.
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would have somehow obtained without any promise to pay for
it. The house I could so construct would certainly be a
meager affair, and even this meager affair would rely upon a
background of contractual interactions that allow for
storefronts such as a Home Depot to exist in the first place.
But compare this to what I can do with access to a
mechanism for guarantying (or at least making it very likely)
that others will perform some of these tasks for me at a
certain time. I could ensure that materials will be delivered
to the construction site at or by a particular date so they will
not be exposed to the elements, or at the very least, so I would
not have to make constant trips to a building supply store. I
can have teams of individuals perform coordinated tasks
simultaneously, motivated by my legally enforceable promise
to pay them. Each of these individuals could be a specialist in
a particular of field of construction, such as a plumber, an
electrician, or a roofer—each of whom could perform greater
and more complicated tasks than a generalist ever could.
Thus, through the power of contracts, I could build a mansion
rather than the shack discussed above. All of this is based
upon my ability to enter into an agreement backed by the
coercive power of the state, which will predictably influence
the actions of others. 177
Without contracts backed by the coercive power of the
state, or some other method of predictably controlling the
future actions of another, coordinated human activity is
impossible. Thus, the purpose of contracts—their raison
d’être—is at a minimum the ability to control another party’s
future activities, and thereby control a future state of affairs.
People might use the form of a contract for other purposes,
but such other purposes are not the primary purpose that
contracts serve in society.
The role that contracts play in society is a contextual fact
that governs the meaning of the language of a contract, and
that militates against the interpretation of contracts in
177. Of course, contracts are not the only kinds of promises backed by
coercive force. I could take out a high interest loan from a well-organized family
business that might be backed by other types of coercive force involving the
future application of a baseball bat to my kneecaps. Even social pressures may
act as a form of coercive force. The moral notion that lying or reneging on one’s
promises is wrong is another type of coercive force attended with consequences
ranging from social ostracization to my inability to enter into such agreements
in the future.
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idiosyncratic ways, i.e., based upon the subjective
understanding of a party. A contract is not merely a
communication between the parties since it must, at the end
of the day, be capable of being implemented by a court. It is a
fair assumption that the parties to contracts know this; that
their
audience—the
parties
to
whom
they
are
communicating—must ultimately include the court if a
contract is to serve its function. This fact rules out the
idiosyncratic use of language by a rational party. It would be
irrational to use a word or phrase in a non-standard, private
way. A rational party will not knowingly say one thing and
mean another because a court will have much more direct
access to public and shared conventions regarding the
meaning of what was said or written, as opposed to what the
speaker or writer subjectively meant. A rational party will
not jest in a contract given the risk that the court will not get
the joke. This presumption makes the possibility that parties
will use words or phrases in idiosyncratic or novel ways far
less of a concern.
The purpose that contracts serve—creating a predictable
future state of affairs—is an essential part of the context by
which the language in a contract must be interpreted. The
notion that the words in a contract cannot be understood
outside of the context of all the extrinsic evidence is highly
questionable given the reasons that parties enter into
contracts in the first place.
Parties to contracts are
attempting to reduce their agreement to writing in a manner
that can be effectively implemented by a court, and parties
will therefore write their contracts so as to achieve that goal.
More importantly, as discussed above, if courts look to
sources of meaning that are not public and shared, and/or not
within the parties’ control, courts undermine this critical
ability to utilize contracts to predictably constrain another
party’s behavior, and undermine society’s ability to engage in
coordinated activity generally.
When courts interpret
contract language outside of the public, shared, and
conventional usage of language, they unmoor language from
the very shared conventions that make communication
possible, and thereby make it impossible for parties to rely
upon those shared conventions to predictably bind each
other’s behavior. As discussed above, parties have far less
control over the kinds of extrinsic evidence that courts look to
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in order to determine the parties’ subjective intent.
C. The Public Meaning Rule and Procedural Legitimacy
The rules governing the admissibility of extrinsic
evidence, as with the rules governing contract interpretation
generally, should be judged not only by the extent to which
they foster predictability and fairness, but also to the extent
they foster a sense of legitimacy among those subject to such
rules. While it is certainly true that a system of rules that
fosters predictability and fair outcomes is more likely to be
seen as legitimate, there is something to be said about
whether a system of contract interpretation itself appears
logical and reasonable rather than strained and legalistic.
The perceived reasonableness of the process itself matters,
not just the outcomes.
As Professors Schwartz and Scott have argued, how
contracting parties expect the court to interpret their
contracts matters. “[T]he issue is not what interpretive style
is best calculated to yield the correct answer. Rather, the
issue is what interpretive style would typical parties want
courts to use when attempting to find the correct answer.” 178
Schwartz and Scott argue that business parties will prefer
judicial interpretations based upon the text of the contract
alone because the costs of drafting and litigating such
contracts will be lower, even if a textualist interpretive
scheme is less effective at determining the intent of the
parties. 179
But it is not just the cost of litigation that drives parties
to prefer the language they have chosen. Parties are likely to
prefer the language they have chosen because they have
chosen it (as opposed to extrinsic evidence of the parties’
words or acts, which the parties have not chosen to be part of
their contract). Rules of a game seem inherently fairer when
those rules are agreed to by the players rather than imposed
by the arbiter after the fact. 180 As discussed in Part IV.A.2.ii,
178. Schwartz & Scott, Contract Theory, supra note 1, at 569.
179. Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Interpretation Redux, 119
YALE L.J. 926, 930 (2010) [hereinafter Schwartz & Scott, Interpretation Redux].
180. This point is illustrated by the court’s reasoning in Hunt Foods,
discussed above. See supra Part IV.A.1. In that case, the court’s search for the
parties’ subjective intent ignored the parties’ explicit and intentional decision to
put the option to purchase in writing without condition. The parties in Hunt
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parties do not choose their course of performance or their
course of dealing in the same way that they choose the
language of their contracts. Choosing the language of a
contract is an explicit choice regarding the thing that will be
used to decide a future dispute. A party’s actions outside of
the contract do not necessarily represent decisions about how
a potential dispute ought to be resolved. The written terms of
a negotiated contract 181 are far less likely to be accidental
than terms implied through conduct, which as discussed in
Part IV, is very frequently compatible with multiple
intentions.
Furthermore, when courts apply canons of interpretation
or rules for the consideration of extrinsic evidence that lead to
interpretations that greatly diverge from common sense and
typical experience, courts lose their legitimacy as reasoned
arbiters. Aside from the purely consequentialist arguments
in this Article, the public meaning rule is better tied to
contracting parties’ legitimate expectations of both how
courts will view their contracts and how they will determine
what the words in the contract mean. Restricting parties to
evidence of public usage bounds the interpretation of words to
those meanings that words in fact have borne, and prevents
courts from considering and applying extrinsic evidence that
would give words purely idiosyncratic meanings.
D. The Public Meaning Rule and Other Problems: Fairness
and Ambiguity
1. Evidence of Intent and Equitable Claims and
Defenses
This Article posits that courts should only consider
extrinsic evidence of public conventions of usage, not extrinsic
Foods did not accidently exclude the condition at issue. Rather, they each
knowingly agreed to be bound by an option contract that did not contain a
condition on the exercise of the option. Thus courts applying the context rule
often ignore or at least undervalue the most relevant evidence of what exactly
the parties agreed to be bound by—i.e., the language that the parties have
chosen to include in (and chosen to exclude from) their written contract.
181. Again, this concept of a contract as rules for dispute resolution which
the parties have agreed to does not apply well, if at all, to consumer contracts of
adhesion, where it is questionable whether the consumer can be said to have
chosen the terms at all. This is yet another reason for limiting the public
meaning rule to negotiated contracts.
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evidence of subjective intent, when determining the meaning
of terms within a contract. However, courts should consider
other types of extrinsic evidence when considering equitable
claims and defenses. In these situations, extrinsic evidence of
what we would normally consider the parties’ intent may be
highly relevant to such considerations of fairness. But courts
should be clear that what they are doing in such cases is
determining what would be a fair resolution of the parties’
dispute based upon various notions of equity—not enforcing
the parties contract.
In such cases, courts are not
determining what the language in a contract means, and by
allowing such equitable defenses, our legal system trades
some predictability for fairness.
As discussed above, contracts give a party the private
right to constrain both her and another’s behavior. 182 It is
this ability to constrain another’s behavior that makes
contracts a useful tool for creating predictability. You and I
agree that if I do X, you will do Y. We set that agreement
down in writing using terms that a third party will be able to
understand and enforce. When a court decides what is fair as
opposed to what the words of the contract mean, the courts
are no longer enforcing the constraints the parties agreed to,
and the predictability creating function of the contract is
undermined. Parties also have far less access to where,
when, and how courts will apply principles of fairness in
determining how a contract ought to be enforced or not. One
need only briefly consult the formulations of such equitable
doctrines to see that such doctrines undermine predictability.
For example, a defense based upon unconscionability is
available essentially where contract terms are “really
unfair.” 183
182. See supra Part IV.B.
183. See Zuver v. Airtouch Commc’ns, Inc., 103 P.3d 753, 759 (Wash. 2004)
(en banc) (“ ‘Shocking to the conscience’, ‘monstrously harsh’, and ‘exceedingly
calloused’ are terms sometimes used to define substantive unconscionability.’ ”
(quoting Nelson v. McGoldrick, 896 P.2d 1258, 1262 (Wash. 1995) (en banc)));
Vasquez-Lopez v. Beneficial Or., Inc., 152 P.3d 940, 948 (Or. Ct. App. 2007)
(“The primary focus . . . appears to be relatively clear: substantial disparity in
bargaining power, combined with terms that are unreasonably favorable to the
party with the greater power may result in a contract or contractual provision
being unconscionable. Unconscionability may involve deception, compulsion, or
lack of genuine consent, although usually not to the extent that would justify
rescission under the principles applicable to that remedy. The substantive
fairness of the challenged terms is always an essential issue.” (quoting Carey v.
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This is by no means a bad thing. But it is a tradeoff
between predictability and fairness that courts and jurists
should recognize and make explicit. Just as formalism trades
equity in the individual case for predictability from case to
case, equitable claims and defenses trade some predictability
from case to case for fairness in each particular case. When
courts look to extrinsic evidence other than public usage, they
trade predictability for fairness.
Even courts that apply a strict plain meaning rule
regarding extrinsic evidence are willing to make this trade
and allow parties to submit extrinsic evidence to show that no
contract was formed in the first place—even where the
contract appears facially unambiguous. Courts applying the
plain meaning rule allow extrinsic evidence to prove defenses
such as unconscionability or fraud. Even under a centuriesold formulation of the plain meaning rule, a party was
allowed to escape liability by showing that she entered into
the contract by fraud or mistake. As early as the 14th
century, an illiterate party who placed his seal upon a
document could escape liability by testifying that the
document was incorrectly read to him. 184 By 1892, courts
were applying the caveat that extrinsic evidence, while
generally inadmissible, may be considered if a party alleges
fraud or mistake. 185
Equitable claims and defenses provide a judicial safety
valve for cases where it would be simply too unfair to enforce
the terms of a contract. For example, because the terms are
just too one sided, because one party was tricked into the
agreement, because one of the parties made an
understandable error, or any of the other numerous bases for
claims in equity. While this Article does not provide an
argument for exactly what equitable claims and defenses the
courts ought to recognize, or what the contours of those
claims and defenses ought to be, the existence of equitable
claims and defenses addresses one of the most frequent
Lincoln Loan Co., 125 P.3d 814, 828 (Or. Ct. App. 2005))).
184. WIGMORE, supra note 64, § 2405, at 15 (“That a man who could not read
had sealed a document which had been incorrectly read over to him, was
recognized, before the 1400s, as sufficient to relieve him from liability.”).
185. E.g., Staver v. Rogers, 28 P. 906, 907 (1892) (holding that extrinsic
evidence is inadmissible “without an allegation in the pleadings that such
contract was in fact signed by the party making such allegations by mistake or
fraud, or without full knowledge of the conditions thereof.”).
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criticisms of contract rules that limit extrinsic evidence—that
such formalist rules produce legalistic and unfair results.
i.

Equitable Doctrines Are a Better Fit for
Equitable/Normative Concerns

Courts should apply equitable doctrines, rather than
interpretive doctrines, to address issues of fairness not only
because it is more judicially honest, but also because
equitable doctrines were created and have developed for the
very purpose of addressing our notions of what is fair. In
contrast, the canons of contract interpretation must
necessarily be concerned with other considerations, such as
predictability and enforcing the constraints the parties
bargained for, and are thus less effective tools for
implementing our notions of fairness.
As discussed above in Part IV, evidence of a party’s
course of performance can be used to give a contract term
meaning which that party never intended. This flies in the
face of what contract interpretation is purportedly about—
enforcing the deal that the parties actually made. But the
equitable defense of estoppel, as compared to contract
interpretation, is not concerned at all with the agreement the
parties reached. Quite the opposite, estoppel (reasonable
reliance) is grounds for disregarding the parties’ agreement
because it would be unfair to enforce it. Estoppel has as its
primary element, the very thing that makes it unfair to
enforce such a contract—that is reasonable reliance upon the
other party’s words or acts. Estoppel, in other words, is
grounded in the very notions of fairness that give evidence of
course of performance and course of dealing its intuitive
appeal.
Similarly, equitable claims for unjust enrichment and
quantum meruit are a much better fit for our intuitions of
fairness than are the rules of contract interpretation. Courts
have described the elements of unjust enrichment as: (1)
whether the plaintiff conferred a benefit upon the defendant,
(2) whether the defendant was aware of the benefit, and (3)
whether it would be unjust for the defendant to retain the
benefit. 186 Again, baked into the elements of such an
186. Volt Servs. Grp v. Adecco Emp’t Servs. Inc., 35 P.3d 329, 337 (Or. Ct.
App. 2001).
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equitable claim are the very notions of fairness that often
cause extrinsic evidence of the parties’ actions to tug our
sense of fairness. Rather than using extrinsic evidence as a
shoehorn to make the language of a contract fit within
society’s sense of fairness, equitable doctrines such as unjust
enrichment allow the court to simply decide what is fair
based upon elements of proof that track our criteria for
fairness.
ii. Equitable Doctrines as a Back Door to Evidence
of Subjective Intent?
Does the existence of equitable claims and defenses
amount to a simple back door which will effectively allow in
extrinsic evidence regardless of the rigor with which the
public meaning rule is enforced? There is good reason to
think not.
With all respect to Professor Gilmore, the
equitable exceptions have not killed contracts.
These
equitable exceptions do not, in fact, swallow the rule. Fraud
and mistake must be proven by clear and convincing
evidence. 187 Waiver must be shown by words or conduct
unequivocally evincing an intent to waive a known right. 188 A
party claiming estoppel must prove reasonable reliance upon
the words or conduct of the party. 189 A party claiming
unconscionability must show that the terms of the contract
“shock the conscience.” 190 These are not easy standards to
meet. Nor do these equitable doctrines merely raise the bar.
187. Vasquez-Lopez, 152 P.3d at 955 (“[A] party asserting fraud must prove
by clear and convincing evidence not only that it relied on the other party’s
misrepresentation, but that the reliance was reasonable under the
circumstances.”); Moyer v. Ramseyer, 359 P.2d 407, 411 (Or. 1961) (“If the
contract had been entered into by mutual mistake, reformation to accommodate
the true understanding of the parties might have been available.”); id. at 412
(“[E]vidence of equities which justify such extraordinary relief as well as
evidence to prove the agreement really intended must be clear and
unequivocal.”).
188. See, e.g., Schmeck v. Bogatay, 485 P.2d 1095, 1099 (Or. 1971) (“[S]ince
waiver must be manifested in some unequivocal manner and requires an intent
to relinquish a known right. In this case, on the contrary, plaintiffs’ conduct
was not an “unequivocal” construction of the lease to the effect claimed by
defendant . . . .” (citation omitted)).
189. See Puziss v. Geddes, 771 P.2d 1028, 1030 (Or. Ct. App. 1989)
(“Detrimental reliance is a required element of estoppel.” (citation omitted)).
190. Fransmart, L.L.C. v. Freshii Dev., L.L.C., 768 F.Supp.2d 851, 870–71
(E.D. Va. 2011) (“The substantive terms of the contract must be so grossly
inequitable that it ‘shocks the conscience.’ ” (citation omitted)).
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Rather, they change the very nature of what a party must
prove.
These heightened standards within these equitable
doctrines also provide a firewall against the types of extrinsic
evidence that can mislead courts. 191 By requiring parties to
prove fraud and mistake by clear and convincing evidence,
these equitable defenses counterbalance the unreliability of
memory and the incentive to lie with a higher threshold of
evidence.
The public meaning rule proposed by this Article thus
has practical consequences and is not simply a way of
reconceptualizing existing rules of contract interpretation. As
an example, evidence of internal communications (such as
board meeting minutes) relating to what one party
understands a term to mean would be admissible under the
context rule, but not admissible under the proposed public
meaning rule, even if a party raised an equitable defense such
as estoppel or waiver.
For example, in Denny’s Restaurants, Inc. v. Security
Union Title Insurance Co., a Washington court applying the
context rule looked to an internal memorandum of one of the
parties when interpreting the language of the parties’
contract. 192 The proponent of this evidence argued that,
under the context rule that had recently been adopted in
Washington, 193 an internal memorandum may be admissible
as evidence of that party’s intent regarding what the terms of
the contract mean. 194 The court agreed, holding that the
memorandum was clear evidence of what the parties
intended. 195
Under the rule proposed in this Article, such evidence
would not have been admissible, either as evidence of the
191. See supra Part III.A.
192. Denny’s Rests., Inc. v. Sec. Union Title Ins. Co., 859 P.2d 619, 630
(Wash. Ct. App. 1993).
193. Id. at 623 (“In order to interpret the original meaning of a contract term,
extrinsic evidence is admissible, even if the term appears unambiguous.”) (citing
Berg v. Hudesman, 801 P.2d 222, 230 (Wash. 1990)).
194. Id. (“Denny’s argues that under Berg, evidence of industry practice and
Security Union’s own internal memoranda should be admissible to demonstrate
the parties’ true intent that the policy was purchased to cover questions of offrecord encroachment and boundary.”).
195. Id. at 627 (“Security Union’s own internal memoranda clearly suggest
that extended policies are intended to insure questions of off-record
encroachment and boundary.”).
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parties’ intent, or as evidence in support of an equitable claim
such as estoppel or waiver. Because the memorandum was
not communicated to the other party, it could not give rise to
detrimental reliance, nor could it evince an intent to waive a
known right. 196
iii. The Canons of Interpretation and Equity
Masquerading as Interpretation
This Article argues for a strict separation between
contract
interpretation
and
equitable/normative
considerations. Courts should be clear and keep separate
when they are determining what the words in a contract
mean and when they are deciding what is fair between the
parties. One place where equitable/normative considerations
can creep into a court’s contract interpretation is through the
canons of contract construction.
For example, the restatement exhorts courts to give
contracts “an interpretation which gives a reasonable, lawful,
and effective meaning” to its terms. 197 As scholars have
recognized, one possible explanation for this cannon is that
parties would not waste their time making a contract that is
However, this explanation is
unlawful and invalid. 198
199
As Professor Zamir notes, this canon is
incomplete at best.
not a sincere attempt to affect the parties’ intentions, rather
it is an attempt to “ ‘push’ contracts away from the domain of
unenforceability”. 200 Likewise, the notion of reasonableness
in this canon of interpretation is intimately connected with
equitable notions such as “good faith, fairness, and justice.” 201

196. If an internal memorandum shows that one party was in fact trying to
dupe the other, it could give rise to a fraud claim, in which case the internal
memorandum would be admissible. See, e.g., McEvoy Travel Bureau, Inc. v.
Norton Co., 563 N.E.2d 188, 193 (Mass. 1990) (explaining that the statement by
a party to contract that it did not intend to enforce contractual termination
provision could form basis for fraud claim, to extent that statement
misrepresented actual intent of the speaker as evidenced by internal
memoranda). But internal memoranda that merely suggest how one party
interpreted the contract would not be admissible under the rule proposed in this
article.
197. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 203(a) (1979).
198. Zamir, supra note 1, at 1722.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 1722–23 (footnotes omitted).
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Professor Zamir argues that the plain meaning rule does
not reflect what courts actually do, which is look to equitable
principles when deciding what contracts mean in the first
instance—i.e., they manipulate the canons of construction to
interpret the contract in a manner that is fair rather than in
a manner that reflects the conventional meaning of the
language in the contract. 202
This Article, however, argues that equitable principles
(such as reasonableness) should not be conflated with
interpretation. As argued above, a scheme of contract
interpretation that replaces the common and public meaning
of language with notions of reasonableness/equity both
undermines parties’ expectations regarding how courts will
interpret their agreements and undermines the very reason
why parties enter into contracts—that is to bind each other’s
future behavior in a manner that is predictable and
commercially useful. Furthermore, as argued in Part IV in
particular, equitable doctrines are better vehicles for
achieving equity than are maxims of contract interpretation.
iv. Limiting the Proposed Rule to Negotiated
Commercial Contracts
As discussed above, rules that exclude extrinsic evidence
tend to be problematic in consumer contracts of adhesion, but
less so in regard to negotiated commercial contracts.
Contracts that are created by a party in a position of superior
sophistication and power and offered to a less sophisticated,
less powerful party on a take it or leave it basis tend to favor
the abuse of superior power and sophistication. In such
cases, the plain meaning of the contract can become a fig leaf
for self-conscious attempts to get parties to agree to terms
that, if properly explained, they never would have agreed to.
Indeed, Professor Zamir makes this very point in arguing for
an inverted hierarchy of contract interpretation, which begins
with notions of fairness at the initial phase of contract
interpretation, explaining that “[i]n the case of detailed
standard-form contracts, customers frequently do not bother
to read most of the provisions of the form. . . .” 203
202. Id. at 1722.
203. Id. at 1771. Professor Zamir goes much further and argues that in most
contracts parties generally fail to say what they mean and that a rule that looks
to notions of reasonableness over the language of the contract is more likely to
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The problem with consumer contracts of adhesion,
however, is one of equity and not one of meaning. As such,
fine print is problematic because people do not read it, not
because it lacks meaning. But the dangers associated with
excluding extrinsic evidence associated with fairness is so
great in cases involving consumer contracts of adhesion, that
it may be best to allow in all such extrinsic evidence at the
outset.
Implementing this distinction between negotiated
commercial contracts and other types of contracts is less
problematic than it might first appear. There are already
specialized bodies of law that apply to various types of
contracts, such as secured transactions, negotiable
instruments, and sales of goods. 204 In particular, Article 2 of
the Uniform Commercial Code includes special provisions
that apply to contracts involving merchants:
‘Merchant’ means a person that deals in goods of the kind
or otherwise holds itself out by occupation as having
knowledge or skill peculiar to the practices or goods
involved in the transaction or to which the knowledge or
skill may be attributed by the person’s employment of an
agent or broker or other intermediary that holds itself out
by occupation as having the knowledge or skill. 205

conform to the parties’ actual intent. (“[I]f it is true that typically there is a gap
between the words of the formal contract and the actual understandings and
intentions of the parties—a claim sustained by empirical findings—then the
interpreter’s concentration on the formal contract may actually frustrate the
goal of realizing these intentions and understandings. . . . It should be stressed
that, although this conclusion is particularly applicable to standard-form
contracts and consumer transactions, it is by no means restricted to these
categories.”). Id. at 1773. The frequency with which parties fail to say what
they mean, however, is not necessarily a basis for imbuing the process of
contract interpretation with notions of reasonableness and fairness. First, as
discussed elsewhere in this Article, the existence of equitable claims and
defenses allows courts to apply notions of fairness and justice without bending
the words that parties have chosen to fit that goal. And, as discussed in Part
IV.D.1.i., these equitable doctrines are a better fit for our notions of fairness
since these equitable doctrines were created to track commonly held notions of
fairness. Second, even if only a minority of parties actually make the effort to
say what they mean (which is itself a controversial proposition), the law should
not disadvantage parties that do, in fact, attempt to say what they mean when
concerns over equity can be dealt with separately through equitable doctrines
tailor made to address such concerns.
204. See, e.g., U.C.C. Arts. 2, 3, 9.
205. U.C.C. § 2-104(1) (2003).
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A very similar provision could be used to determine when
the rule proposed in this Article ought to be applied.
Specifically, negotiated commercial contracts could be defined
as “negotiated contracts between persons or entities that deal
in goods or services of the kind, as either buyers or sellers.”
Such a broad, abstract rule certainly has much play in its
joints, but courts have managed to apply the definition of
“merchant” under the U.C.C. in an intelligible way.
In fact, courts have applied the concept of contracts
between merchants in a manner that is similar to that which
is suggested in this Article. In K & M Joint Venture v. Smith
International, Inc., the court applied the notion of a contract
between merchants to include not only parties with
“specialized knowledge as to the goods” being transacted, but
also parties with “specialized knowledge as to business
practices” within the relevant industry. 206 The contract at
issue in K & M was between a company that sold machines
for boring tunnels and a joint venture that was formed for the
purpose of bidding on a sewer project for the City of
Cleveland. 207 The court noted that while the joint venture
was not a merchant in the sense of one who sells the
particular goods in question, “one of the joint venturers, had
excavated eight tunnels using boring machines before the
joint venture was formed.” 208 Accordingly, the court held that
the joint venture should be held to the stricter standards
applied to merchants under the U.C.C. 209
One might argue that a less restrictive rule for extrinsic
evidence regarding consumer contracts of adhesion will
undermine predictability for such contracts. But for such
contracts, stare decisis will provide the predictability that is
otherwise missing under the context rule. Commercial
contracts of adhesion almost always involve boiler plate
language that is reused in numerous form contracts that are
entered into again and again. When the same paragraph is
entered into over and over again between a commercial entity
and its customers, and a court renders a judgment regarding
that paragraph, the court’s ruling will apply broadly to all of
206.
1982).
207.
208.
209.

K & M Joint Venture v. Smith Int’l, Inc., 669 F.2d 1106, 1115 (6th Cir.
Id. at 1108.
Id. at 1115.
Id.
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the contracts containing that paragraph. Thus, where a court
decides the effect of a form contract, even in equity, its ruling
will have force in later cases involving the same language. 210
This simply is not possible for non-standard contracts, which
differ from case to case.
2. Conflicting Usage and Ambiguity
As explained above, the rule proposed in this Article
would allow extrinsic evidence where there are two or more
common usages of a term. This extrinsic evidence would be
limited to biographical evidence submitted by each party to
show that the common usage it propounds is relevant to the
parties, e.g., evidence that a term has a particular usage
among computer programmers and evidence that the party
propounding that usage is a computer programmer. In fact,
courts may be able to determine the relevant usage from
biographical information within the contract itself, such as
the fact that the parties are computer programmers.
But there will be cases where courts cannot determine a
single relevant usage based upon the text of the contract and
evidence of how the words of the text are properly used in
language.
Such ambiguity can arise in at least two ways. First, the
parties may have no relevant public usages in common.
Second, a term may have two conflicting public usages, each
of which is relevant to both of the parties. In the first case,
parties would be limited to equitable remedies under the rule
proposed in this Article since there would be no way to assign
a single meaning to the contract. In the second case, the
court would have to look to extrinsic evidence of the activity
the parties were engaged in at the time of contracting to
determine which of multiple relevant public usages applies.
i.

Irreconcilable Conflicting Usages

There will be cases where there is no common usage
applicable to both contracting parties. In such a case, the
language of the contract is irreconcilably ambiguous and
cannot be assigned a single meaning, much as if the parties
210. See Michael Klausner, The Contractarian Theory of Corporate Law: A
Generation Later, 31 J. CORP. L. 779, 793 (2006) (“As a legal rule or charter term
is interpreted and applied in a variety of settings, however, the term acquires
more content, and uncertainty regarding its application declines.”).
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agreed to a word that has one meaning in German and one
meaning in English, and neither party spoke the other’s
language. Both parties are right in the sense that both have
properly used the language. But the parties literally did not
say the same thing.
A good example of this would be in contracts between
speakers of the same language but from different countries
where the same word has two different common usages. For
example, if an American company enters into a contract with
a British company to purchase 100 beakers, the American
company will almost certainly expect to get 100 flat-bottomed
vessels with a lip commonly used as a laboratory container, 211
while the British company will likely provide the American
company with 100 handle-less drinking cups. 212 In such a
case, the term “beaker” as used in this example has no single
meaning applicable to both of the parties and the contract is
irreconcilably ambiguous.
As explained above, courts ought to (and often do) settle
such cases based upon equitable notions, such as whether one
party had reason to know the common usage employed by the
other. Even if neither party has such reason to know, courts
should (and often do) apply remedies to equitably distribute
the burden of the ambiguity.
The famous case Raffles v. Wichelhaus typifies yet
another form of ambiguity that courts need to address. 213 In
this case, two parties entered into a contract for the sale of
cotton arriving by ship from India. 214 According to the
contract, the cotton was to be delivered by the ship “Peerless,”
however two ships of that name sailed from Bombay roughly
one month apart. 215 The seller and the promised cotton were
aboard the second “Peerless” and after the first ship arrived
without the promised cotton, the buyer filed for breach of
contract. 216
While the majority ruled that the existence of two ships
named “Peerless” was not a defense to liability, courts have
211. WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 190 (Philip Babcock
Gove et al. eds., Merriam-Webster, Inc. 1993).
212. THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 726 (James A.H. Murray et al., eds.,
Oxford University Press 1933).
213. Raffles v. Wichelhaus (1864) 159 Eng. Rep. 375.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id.
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subsequently adopted the dissent’s view that a party may
present extrinsic evidence of a latent ambiguity to show that
the parties differed in their understanding of the contract. 217
The Raffles case and others like it, however, are better
understood as mutual mistakes of fact rather than true
ambiguity. Such supposed “latent ambiguity” cases involve
terms that unambiguously indicate that the world is one way,
when in fact the world is another way. In the Raffles case,
the parties’ contract indicated that there would be one ship
named “Peerless” sailing from Bombay, when in fact, there
were two. 218 In this way, the notion of latent ambiguity is
really a mutual mistake of fact by the parties.
The court’s role in such a case is to determine a fair
resolution, not to determine what the word “Peerless” means.
In such a case, the court cannot determine who ought to
suffer the consequences of the parties’ mistake based upon
the meaning of the language within the contract, but the
court still has to pick a winner and a loser, or at least divide
the costs associated with the parties’ mistake. A ruling that
the parties failed to reach an agreement and, that the
contract is therefore not enforceable, merely declares that the
parties’ contractual duties of performance are excused by
default.
ii. Multiple Relevant Usages
In other cases, there may be two or more meanings
relevant to both parties. In such cases, the court should
admit further evidence regarding the activity the parties were
engaged in when they drafted the contract. This is not
evidence of the public and conventional meaning of language,
but neither is it evidence of the parties’ intent.
This concept is demonstrated by the following
hypothetical. Imagine that two parties enter into a written
contract where “Party A agrees to deliver the bag marked X
to the bank in return for $10.” Both of these parties speak
English where the word “bank” can be used to mean “a place
217. Id. (“There is nothing on the face of the contract to show that any
particular ship called the ‘Peerless’ was meant; but the moment it appears that
two ships called the Peerless were about to sail from Bombay there is a latent
ambiguity, and parol evidence may be given for the purpose of showing that the
defendant meant one ‘Peerless’ and the plaintiff another.”)
218. Id.
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where money is stored” or “the side of a river.” Based upon
the language of the contract alone, this contract could call for
Party A to deliver the bag to a place that stores money, or to
the side of a river. Extrinsic evidence of the activity the
parties were engaged in, such as evidence that the bag was
obviously full of money (as opposed to say fishing tackle)
would be necessary to resolve the ambiguity. Such evidence
is not evidence of intent, nor is it evidence of the possible
relevant usages of the text of the contract.
This resort to such extrinsic evidence to resolve such an
ambiguity is no different from what courts do under both the
plain meaning rule and the context rule, where the full range
of extrinsic evidence is relevant to resolve a facial ambiguity,
so long as it does not contradict the language of a contract.
Translated into the language of the public meaning rule, even
in the case of an ambiguity, such extrinsic evidence could not
be used to support a usage that is not relevant to either party.
In the above example, the parties could not submit extrinsic
evidence that they understood the word “bank” to mean a
restaurant if there is no evidence that either party belongs to
a language group that uses the word “bank” in that way.
SUMMARY, CONCLUSION, AND AREAS FOR FURTHER
SCHOLARSHIP
Both the plain meaning rule and the context rule are
problematic, albeit in different ways.
The observations in this Article regarding the problems
with both the plain meaning and the context rule suggest a
new rule for when and what kinds of extrinsic evidence courts
ought to consider. Courts should admit extrinsic evidence
regarding how a term is publically and conventionally used in
language, but exclude extrinsic evidence of the parties’
subjective intent, when determining what the terms in a
contract mean.
Evidence typically associated with the
parties’ intent may be relevant to various equitable defenses
and equitable claims. But here, courts are not interpreting
the contract, they are doing equity. Courts should make this
attendant tradeoff between predictability and fairness
explicit.
As discussed above, parties enter into contracts in order
to predictably control other parties’ behavior—i.e., to ensure
that another party will perform (or not perform) a certain act
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at a certain time. This ability to control, or at least
predictably influence, another party’s behavior is what makes
a contract a useful tool for coordinating human activity.
When courts fail to interpret a contract in a manner
consistent with the public and conventional meaning of words
and phrases, courts undermine this crucial ability to
predictably influence another party’s behavior, and thus
undermine an essential purpose that contracts serve.
While this Article has focused primarily upon the
categories of extrinsic evidence that courts should or should
not consider, it also reflects a broader rehabilitation of
formalist conventions within the law of contracts. This
Article is a microcosm of the larger notion that while formal
legal doctrines may not constitute absolute objective truths,
the law cannot operate without shared and commonly obeyed
formal doctrines that give the law structure and foster
predictability. Our particular legal conventions may be
historically contingent, but a system of laws cannot operate
without a coherent system of publically shared conventions,
even if they are cobbled together through trial and error.
Formal rules, in both contract law and in communication, are
necessary for either endeavor to succeed. 219
As any second year law student will attest, strict
formalism is dead. Law schools no longer teach the law as a
series of objectively true legal principles that can be deduced
from the case law and then applied mechanically to any
particular set of facts to arrive at the proper result. That war
is over and the legal realists have won. This is particularly
true for the law of contracts where the notion that words in a
contract can have an absolute and objective plain meaning
has been thoroughly debunked. 220
But even in this demystified world that the legal realists
have made, the bones of legal formalism still stand as the
structure upon which the law clings and grows. The various
fact-intensive and fuzzy equitable doctrines that choked the
life from the formalist enterprises of Langdell and Williston
are still applied within a framework of formalist concepts. It
219. See Scott, supra note 50, at 851 n.11 (“[T]he ‘new formalism’ rejects the
categorical imperative to deduce rules from first principles that characterized
classical formalism as practiced by the late-19th-century Langdellians.”).
220. See Ricks, supra note 146, at 768 (“The fashion in American law schools
is to teach that contract language cannot have a plain meaning.”).
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is impossible to discuss the law of contracts without such
formalist concepts as offer, acceptance, and consideration,
and these formal doctrines are still applied alongside their
equitable counterparts. These formalist concepts are not true
in some platonic sense. But whether or not “Contract, like
God, is dead,” 221 we all continue to quote its formalist
scripture. Courts continue to invoke the preexisting duty rule
and the doctrine of illusory promises, even as they recognize
claims for unjust enrichment and promissory estoppel.
Simply because we realize that our legal rules are
conventions rather than absolute truths does not mean that
we should, or even can, discard them completely. Our
common law and the society it serves needs these formalist
conventions in order to function lest the jurisprudence of
commercial exchange collapse into an unpredictable tangle of
pure equity. The rule of law entails the existence of laws and
rules for their application. To rid the law of all its formality
would reduce our legal system to unstructured pleas at the
foot of a monarch—whose notions of justice and fairness
might change from case to case. Laws, by definition, are
meant to apply to a range of factual situations across time.
Inevitably, rules have Procrustean consequences. But the
stretching and chopping of facts to fit within a finite number
of legal principles is a necessary sacrifice if our legal system
is to have any uniformity and predictability and if we at all
care about the notion of consistent treatment before the law.
People need conventions in order to communicate,
regardless of whether those conventions reflect some sort of
absolute meaning, or merely an implicit and reflexive
agreement within a society to use language in a certain way.
Contract interpretation is simply a special case of this same
principle. We cannot do away with formalist conventions,
such as rules limiting extrinsic evidence, without reducing
the law of contracts to pure questions of equity, the outcomes
of which are difficult to predict, and therefore, not conducive
to stable commerce. The way courts go about interpreting
contracts should reflect this need for conventions while at the
same time recognizing that such conventions are not

221. GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 1 (Ronald K.L. Collins ed.,
Ohio State University Press 1995) (1974).
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necessarily true in an absolute sense. Shared conventions of
one sort or another are required for language to have
meaning, for commerce to occur, and for the law of contracts
to function.
While this Article provides a framework for the types of
extrinsic evidence that courts ought to consider when
interpreting a facially unambiguous contract, and then goes
through several examples, it does not provide an exhaustive
analysis of exactly what sorts of extrinsic evidence constitute
evidence of the conventional and public use of words and
phrases as opposed to extrinsic evidence of the parties’
subjective intent. While this Article argues that the line
between interpretation and equity should be clearly drawn, it
does not propose an argument for exactly where that line
should fall. In future articles, I intend to provide an
exhaustive analysis of where various other particular kinds of
extrinsic evidence would fall under the public meaning rule.
In addition, I intend to argue for where exactly the line
between interpretation and equity should be drawn, in
particular, by critically assessing the elements of the various
equitable claims and defenses in light of the particular
notions of fairness that animate them.

